Tag Archives: Standing

DeGirolami on Standing and Justiciability in the Same-Sex Marriage Cases

I have a short piece over at Commonweal on the issues of standing and justiciability in United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry. Here’s a little bit:

Yet the question of relevance persists: Even if lawyers and judges pay attention to standing, why should the public care about it, particularly when matters of equality, freedom, and civil rights are jostling for the limelight?

First, because less is more. The Supreme Court wields its power within the constitutional structure only as long as it also retains a firm sense of the limits of that power. When it exceeds those limits, it disrupts the constitutional order and threatens its own authority. As always, Tocqueville saw this clearly:

The political power which the Americans have intrusted to their courts of justice is therefore immense, but the evils of this power are considerably diminished by the obligation which has been imposed of attacking the laws through the courts of justice alone. If the judge had been empowered to contest the laws on the ground of theoretical generalities, if he had been enabled to open an attack or to pass a censure on the legislator, he would have played a prominent part in the political sphere; and as the champion or the antagonist of a party, he would have arrayed the hostile passions of the nation in the conflict.

Or, as Justice Antonin Scalia put it in his dissent in the DOMA case, a free-floating power to say what the law is would be “an assertion of judicial supremacy over the people’s representatives in Congress and the executive”—an unsustainable exercise of judicial force that risks destroying the constitutional separation of powers.

Second, it is we who have the primary duty to make the law. We are given that duty by the federal and state constitutions, each of which provides representative mechanisms for us to discharge our duty. But the duty remains ours, not the Supreme Court’s. Constitutions are collections of entrenched choices made by the people to obligate not only their representatives and officials, but also themselves. Justice Kennedy’s dissent in the Proposition 8 case likewise notes that California’s popular initiative system represents a choice by the people of the state about where to vest law-making authority. A people that has no time for justiciability is more likely to cede its law-making powers and duties. Eventually, it will not even remember what power it has surrendered. It will then have the judges it deserves.

Notre Dame HHS Mandate Lawsuit Dismissed on Standing and Ripeness Grounds

Well, it seems I was a bit…unripe in expressing the view that the HHS mandate suits seem not to be going the government’s way.  The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana has dismissed the University of Notre Dame’s complaint against Health and Human Services on standing and ripeness grounds.  Notre Dame falls within the safe harbor provision and so the as yet unknown ‘Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking/putative proposed accommodation/vague promise of emendation of the current legal rule’ applies to it.  I quote the court’s language (along with its citations to those cases dealing with entities within and outside the safe harbor, many of which we have discussed before at CLR Forum) at length, as it may be helpful to readers to have it all in front of them:

This is one of dozens of similar suits filed across the nation, and courts have ruled on similar dismissal motions in several of those cases. Some of those rulings dealt with plaintiffs not in the safe harbor; as will be seen, those plaintiffs’ circumstances are too dissimilar to Notre Dame’s for those rulings to be helpful. See, e.g., Grote Indus., LLC v. Sebelius, No. 4:12cv00134-SEB-DML S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F.Supp.2d 1278 (W.D.Okla. 2012), application for injunction denied 2012 WL 6698888 (U.S., Dec. 26, 2012) (Sotamayor, J.); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5817323 (D.D.C., Nov. 16, 2012); Legatus v. Sebelius 2012 WL 5359630 (E.D.Mich., Oct. 31, 2012); O’Brien v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2012 WL 4481208 E.D.Mo., Sept. 28, 2012); Newland v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 3069154 (D.Colo., July 27, 2012).

Of the rulings involving plaintiffs in the safe harbor, all but one have found the claims unripe and the plaintiffs to have lacked standing. Zubik v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5932977 (W.D.Pa., Nov. 27, 2012); Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D.Tenn., Nov. 21, 2012); Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 3637162 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal held in abeyance 2012 WL 6652505 (D.C.Cir. 2012); Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 2914417 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal held in abeyance sub nom Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6652505 (D.C.Cir. 2012); Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Svcs., 2012 WL 2913402 (D.Neb. 2012); contra, Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6042864 E.D.N.Y. ,2012).  None of those rulings bind this court, but the majority are persuasive. Notre Dame’s claims aren’t ripe, and they don’t have standing to bring them.

Both conclusions flow from the government’s creation of a safe harbor for certain employers (including Notre Dame) while it re-works the regulation. As a result, Notre Dame faces no penalty or restriction based on the existing regulatory requirement . . . .

Turning first to ripeness, the challenged regulatory requirement isn’t sufficiently final. Notre Dame is correct that regulation itself claims to be final, 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv), but events following the regulation’s adoption make clear that it isn’t final. The defendants have announced their intention to refashion the rule in an effort to address concerns such as those Notre Dame has raised and, by virtue of the safe harbor provision, have exempted Notre Dame from the rule for the time believed to be required for the re-fashioning. The government is entitled to a presumption of good faith in such promises . . . .

Our defendants have taken prompt and concrete action — the safe harbor provision — indicating that its [sic] rule is subject to reconsideration and modification.  Although Notre Dame is correct that an agency can’t “stave off judicial review of a challenged rule simply by initiating a new proposed rulemaking that would amend the rule in a significant way,” American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 683 F.3d 382, 388 (D.C. Cir. 2012), none of the cases on which Notre Dame relies involve any parallel to the safe harbor provision that protects Notre Dame and others like it from the challenged rule.

Turning back to the question of standing, the challenged regulatory
requirement isn’t the cause of the injuries of which Notre Dame complains. Taking the defendants at their word concerning the intended reworking of the rule, this regulatory requirement won’t require Notre Dame to conduct itself in ways its Catholic mission forbids. This regulation’s replacement might do so, but no one can say because that future rule hasn’t been promulgated. It is enough to know that the present regulation is to be replaced by another, and the safe harbor is protecting Notre Dame from harm to its religious precepts until that replacement occurs.

Indeed, “no one can say” what the replacement rule might do because “no one can say” what the promised proposed rule is, or might be, or is contemplated to be.  But every banana ripens at some point.

The case is University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 3:12CV253RLM (N.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012).

An Important HHS Mandate Decision: Standing & Ripeness Satisfied

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York has denied in part and granted in part the federal government’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss the complaint of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, Catholic Health Care Systems, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre and Catholic Charities, and Catholic Health Services of Long Island (CHSLI).  The case is important on the issues of standing and ripeness.  The plaintiffs operate self-insured health plans which they believe do not qualify for grandfathered status, though they all do qualify for the safe harbor (meaning that no enforcement would occur against them until January 1, 2014).  The decision is complicated and has several moving parts.  Here’s the scoop, after the jump.

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Another Mandate Lawsuit Dismissed on Ripeness Grounds

The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has dismissed without prejudice the complaint of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Pittsburgh, and Catholic Cemeteries against the federal government related to the contraception mandate.  The Diocese of Pittsburgh operates several schools and other charitable institutions, and it self-insures its employees; some of its health plans were grandfathered in by the regulations, some were not.

The court held that the temporary safe harbor provision (which expires on January 1, 2014) and the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking filed by the federal government on March 21, 2012, which suggests that the government may be amenable to an emendation of the (now final) rule, both indicate that the case is unripe.  As my constitutional law students studying for their Tuesday examination will surely know, ripeness turns on the questions of “fitness” of the issue for adjudication and hardship to the parties of denying review.  The court held that even though the current law is final and has been formally promulgated, the noises made by the government about changing the regulations — in combination with the temporary safe harbor and the presumption that the government is acting in good faith — mean that the case is unripe.  The reasoning more or less follows the pattern set in the Belmont Abbey case (see prior posting).  For good measure, the court held that plaintiffs here had failed to allege standing as, in the court’s view, the injury alleged was too speculative.

The case is Zubik v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5932977 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 2012).

Wheaton College Case Against HHS Dismissed on Standing and Ripeness Grounds

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia has dismissed Wheaton College’s complaint against Kathleen Sebelius and the Department of Health and Human Services on standing and ripeness grounds.  As to standing, the court held that Wheaton’s allegations only made out claims of “future possible injury” because HHS has informed Wheaton that it qualifies for the safe harbor provisions of the mandate, and because an enforcement action by HHS within the safe harbor is neither imminent nor likely.  As to ripeness, the court said: “Because they are in the process of being amended, the preventive services regulations are by definition a tentative agency position,” and therefore unfit for adjudication.

The case is Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 3637162 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2012).

Eleventh Circuit Remands Ten Commandmants Case on Standing Grounds

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has remanded a case to the district court involving a 5-foot-tall monument of the Ten Commandments which sits beside an entrance to the Dixie County Courthouse in Florida.  The plaintiff, a North Carolina resident who was considering whether to purchase property in the County, made his way to the Courthouse and saw the monument.  As the Eleventh Circuit put it, “the experience of seeing the statue was a negative one” (though after the shock had passed, he was able to recover and proceed with his business).

The plaintiff never did purchase any land in the County, but the ACLU used him in an attempt to get itself standing to sue the County for violating the Establishment Clause.  Standing demands a concrete injury.  When deposed, the plaintiff indicated that the reason he did not purchase property in the County was due to “the display of the monument” and because “I found other things I was offended by.”  A later affidavit by the plaintiff indicates instead that the monument was the but-for cause of his decision not to purchase property.  The district court denied a motion for summary judgment by the County on the issue of standing, and granted the ACLU’s motion for summary judgment on the merits.

For the Eleventh Circuit, the issue seems to be whether the plaintiff had standing to sue, and the remand has to do with an evidentiary question about the reasons for the plaintiff’s decision not to purchase property in the County.  The initial deposition and later affidavit seem to be in some tension (the Court called the affidavit “suspect, given that it seems designed to strengthen [plaintiff’s] standing claim”).  By granting the ACLU’s summary judgment motion, the district court improperly resolved a disputed factual question.

Judge Edmonson filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that the case should be dismissed now because plaintiff has failed to meet the standing requirement.  He would have relied on the “clear and unambiguous answers” in the deposition, not the later prepared affidavit, to dismiss the case.  Judge Edmonson notes that the “other things” that offended the plaintiff (as stated in the deposition) included: (1) a cartoon in the County assessor’s office depicting an American soldier telling a French official “Well, you didn’t make me show a Visa when I landed in Normandy”; (2) a writing in the assessor’s office that said something like “the only two who gave blood for you or gave their souls for you were Jesus and the veterans”; and (3) a website that included the words “Patriot Properties” and “Dixie” in its web address, which an employee in the assessor’s office recommended that plaintiff visit if he had more questions.  Plaintiff also stated that he was discomfited by the fact that the locals were “a bit cold.”

The case is ACLU of Florida, Inc. v. Dixie County, Florida (August 15, 2012).

States’ Lawsuit Against the HHS Mandate Dismissed

Yesterday was an active day for the HHS Mandate litigation.  The U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska dismissed an action by several States (Nebraska, South Carolina, Texas, Florida, Ohio, and Oklahoma) and several organizational and individual plaintiffs against the mandate, also on grounds of standing and ripeness. 

The organizational and individual plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed on the ground that their health plans would be grandfathered in, and that the claim that they would be “trapped” in their plans, without any real allegation that they were planning to change their plans, was too “speculative” to serve as a basis for standing.

Likewise, the States’ claims of injury, said the court, were founded “in layers of conjecture” about what would happen if religious employers stop insuring and the possible effect on the States’ Medicaid programs.  These conjectures were too speculative to confer standing.

Just like (amazingly, almost exactly like) the D.C. District Court, this court ruled on the ripeness claim even though technically it did not need to.  Notwithstanding the fact the existing rule “should be considered ‘definitive’ by virtue of its formal promulgation,” the court found that the “tenative nature of the Department’s position” counseled declining review at this point.

I’m sensing a pattern here…

Belmont Abbey College HHS Mandate Suit Dismissed on Standing and Ripeness Grounds

Yesterday, the U.S. District Court for the D.C. Circuit dismissed Belmont Abbey’s law suit alleging that the contraception mandate violates RFRA and the First Amendment.  The grounds are lack of standing and ripeness.  The court rejected the government’s claims that Belmont Abbey lacked standing because it qualified for “grandfathered” status.  It also rejected the government’s claim that any injury to Belmont was insufficiently imminent; the court held that the January 2014 deadline was not “too remote.”

But the court accepted the government’s claim that Belmont’s injury was too speculative because of the government’s stated intention to engage in new rulemaking before the expiration of the safe harbor.  It rejected Belmont’s claim that “non-binding promises of future rulemaking” can defeat standing, ruling that the government has done more than promise: it has published its plan to amend and it has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking.  “The government,” said the court, “has done nothing to suggest that it might abandon its efforts to modify the rule—indeed, it has steadily pursued that course—and it is entitled to a presumption that it acts in good faith.”  The court also dismissed the case for lack of ripeness.

There is an interesting feature of the case that appears in the ripeness discussion.  Belmont claimed that the case was ripe because even if the proposed rulemaking goes through, it would not be able to comply without violating its religious beliefs about contraception.  The court said this:

This argument assumes, however, that a particular approach described in the ANPRM—which would require health-insurance issuers to offer group plans without contraceptive coverage to organizations with religious objections while “simultaneously [providing] contraceptive coverage directly to the participants and beneficiaries covered under the organization’s plan with no cost sharing,” see 77 Fed.Reg. 16503—will make it into the final rule. Such an assumption is speculative. The ANPRM merely “presents questions and ideas to help shape discussions” regarding how best to accommodate organizations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage. Id. The Notice specifically states that it seeks input on the options it proposes “as well as new ideas to inform the next stage of the rulemaking process.” Id. (emphasis added). The rulemaking process is still in its early stages, and the contents of the final amendment have not yet been decided. It would thus be premature to find that the amendment will not adequately address Plaintiff’s concerns.

Belmont tried to resist this holding by claiming that all the government then needs to do to avoid adjudication is to file a notice of proposed rulemaking.  Though the court acknowledged this possibility, and it even said that the “circumstances are slightly less favorable to the agency here” than in another case where this possibility had been raised, it took the government at its word — or perhaps it is more accurate to say that the court took the government at its promised future word, whatever that word turns out to be.  Dismissal was without prejudice.

It would not surprise me at all if this were the approach taken by at least some other courts reviewing this litigation.

Seventh Circuit Says Hein Applies to State Funding Decisions

I posted about a Sixth Circuit case last week applying Hein‘s restrictive standing doctrine to dismiss an Establishment Clause challenge to a federal spending decision. Yesterday, the Seventh Circuit applied Hein to dismiss an Establishment Clause challenge to a state spending decision. An Illinois state agency had approved a $20,000 grant to a private organization, “Friends of the Cross,” to help restore the Bald Knob Cross, a local tourist attraction. Plaintiff brought suit, arguing that the grant failed the endorsement test, and claiming standing as an Illinois taxpayer.

The Seventh Circuit dismissed the challenge on standing grounds. Hein limited taxpayer standing to cases alleging specific legislative appropriations, not executive decisions, the court explained, and this limit applied to state as well as federal spending decisions. Here, the legislature had appropriated a $5 million lump sum for “member initiatives”; following Illinois tradition, a single legislator had requested that the executive direct part of the grant to the Friends, and the executive had complied.  Because the ultimate decision to fund the Friends had come from the executive branch, the court ruled, plaintiff lacked standing to challenge it under Hein. The case is Sherman v. Illinois, 2012 WL 1970592 (7th Cir. June 4, 2012).

Sixth Circuit Rules Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Challenge Government’s Bailout of Firm Selling Sharia-Compliant Financial Products

In a recent contribution for a symposium CLR hosted here at St. John’s, Steve Smith argued that the Supreme Court’s restrictive standing doctrine in Establishment Clause cases has helpfully kept many disputes out of court. A Sixth Circuit case handed down on Friday provides a good example. Plaintiff challenged the U.S. Treasury’s provision of $70 billion to American International Group (AIG), which, through its subsidiaries, sells Sharia-compliant financial products, for example, products that avoid returns from “pork, alcohol, interest, gambling, or pornography.” Treasury disbursed the money pursuant to TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program, which Treasury established pursuant to the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). Plaintiff argued that the disbursement amounted to a promotion of Islam in violation of the Establishment Clause and claimed standing as a federal taxpayer.

The Sixth Circuit disagreed. Relying principally on the  Supreme Court’s 2007 holding in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, the court held that plaintiff lacked standing. Under Hein, the court explained, “a taxpayer-plaintiff has standing to challenge an executive-branch disbursement of funds only if the appropriating statute expressly contemplates the disbursement of federal funds to support religious groups or activities.” EESA did not; Treasury had made the decision to fund AIG on its own. “Neither . . . EESA nor any reasonable inference from its historical context suggest that Congress knew, or much less intended, that TARP funds might support the marketing and sale of” Sharia-compliant products, the court wrote. “It was only through executive discretion that TARP funds were transferred to AIG.”  The case is Murray v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury (6th Cir., June 1, 2012).