Kristen A. Carpenter (U. of Colorado Law School) has posted Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in American Indian Religious Freedoms. The abstract follows.
Employment Division v. Smith was a watershed moment in First Amendment law, with the Supreme Court holding that neutral statutes of general applicability could not burden the free exercise of religion. Congress’s subsequent attempts, including the passage of Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, to revive legal protections for religious practice through the legislative and administrative process have received tremendous attention from legal scholars. Lost in this conversation, however, have been the American Indians at the center of the Smith case. Indeed, for them, the decision criminalizing the possession of their peyote sacrament was only the last in a series of Supreme Court cases denying American Indian Free Exercise Clause claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s Indian cases share a common and previously overlooked feature: in all of them, the Court assessed the Indian claims as too broad or too idiosyncratic to merit Free Exercise Clause protection and instead denied them through a succession of bright line formulations.
Identifying the unrequited search for a “limiting principle” as a basis for analysis, this Article reassesses the religion cases and underlying theoretical questions of institutionalism and equality, in their Indian context. It then identifies two contemporary policy shifts—namely Congress’s decision to entrust accommodation of Indian religious freedoms to federal agencies and its decision to do so at the tribal, versus individual, level—that have, in some respects, facilitated an “empowering practices” approach to American Indian religious liberties in the post-Smith era. Taking a descriptive and contextual approach, the Article illuminates opportunities for additional law reform in the American Indian context and also larger questions of institutionalism, equality, and pluralism in religious freedoms law.
The Tale of Psychic Sophie, Part II
Psychic Sophie, as I mentioned in Part I, appealed the district court’s unfavorable disposition of her case to the Fourth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals, which held oral argument on it Tuesday. Chief Judge Traxler, Judge Wilkinson, and Judge Duncan made up the panel. Here’s a news report on the argument. A couple of highlights.
First, in response to an inquiry about whether predicting the future is “inherently deceptive” (and therefore should not receive constitutional protection), counsel for the defendant County said, “Yes, sir, it is.” To which CJ Traxler responded, “How would you characterize the Book of Revelation?” Counsel for the plaintiff seems to have argued that predicting the future is not “inherently” deceptive provided that the prognosticator ”sincerely believes” the prediction or does not believe that he is being deceptive. Does the deceptiveness of a prediction of the future depend on the speaker’s subjective belief as to its truthfulness and/or his intent to deceive? I wouldn’t think so, but I’m not a free speech maven. But I suppose one might have replied that predictions of the future are not “inherently” deceptive; they are only contingently true (or false) – the contingency being their (dis-)confirmation on the appointed day. We’re still waiting on Revelation. On the other hand, Montaigne, in his essay, “On Prognostication,” doesn’t see what all the fuss is about: “[A]lthough there still remain among us certain methods of divination, by the stars, by spirits, by ghosts, by dreams, and otherwise — a notable example of the senseless curiosity of our nature, occupying itself with future matters, as if it had not enough to do in digesting those at hand –…. It is no advantage to know the future; for it is a wretched thing to suffer suspense all to no purpose[.]“
Second, Judge Duncan was interested in the question of whether Psychic Sophie’s business and belief system were “religious” or instead a “way of life.” But Judge Wilkinson seemed dubious: “If what she’s expressed is a religion, then anything and everything is a religion.” Kevin Walsh quite rightly suggested to me that skepticism about astrology has a distinguished pedigree dating back at least to St. Augustine. From Book IV, Chapter 3 of the Confessions:
There was in those days a wise man, very skillful in medicine, and much renowned therein, who had with his own proconsular hand put the Agonistic garland upon my distempered head, not, though, as a physician; for this disease Thou alone healest, who resistest the proud, and givest grace to the humble. But didst Thou fail me even by that old man, or forbear from healing my soul? For when I had become more familiar with him, and hung assiduously and fixedly on his conversation (for though couched in simple language, it was replete with vivacity, life, and earnestness), when he had perceived from my discourse that I was given to books of the horoscope-casters, he, in a kind and fatherly manner, advised me to throw them away, and not vainly bestow the care and labour necessary for useful things upon these vanities; saying that he himself in his earlier years had studied that art with a view to gaining his living by following it as a profession, and that, as he had understood Hippocrates, he would soon have understood this, and yet he had given it up, and followed medicine, for no other reason than that he discovered it to be utterly false, and he, being a man of character, would not gain his living by beguiling people.
Looking forward to the panel’s decision.
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Posted in Commentary, Marc O. DeGirolami
Tagged Definition of Religion, Free Exercise Clause, Free Speech, Recent Cases, RLUIPA