Tag Archives: Religious Liberty

Munoz, “Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court: The Essential Cases and Documents, Updated Edition”

In March, Rowman & Littlefield released “Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court: The Essential Cases and Documents, Updated Edition” by Vincent Phillip Munoz (University of Notre Dame). The publisher’s description follows:

Throughout American history, legal battles concerning the First Amendment’s protection of religious liberty have been among the most contentious issue of the rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court: The Essential Cases and Documents represents the most authoritative and up-to-date overview of the landmark cases that have defined religious freedom in America. Noted religious liberty expert Vincent Philip Munoz (Notre Dame) provides carefully edited excerpts from over fifty of the most important Supreme Court religious liberty cases. In addition, Munoz’s substantive introduction offers an overview on the constitutional history of religious liberty in America. Introductory headnotes to each case provides the constitutional and historical context. Religious Liberty and the American Supreme Court is an indispensable resource for anyone interested matters of religious freedom from the Republic’s earliest days to current debates.

“Politics of Religious Freedom” (Sullivan et al., eds.)

This June, University of Chicago Press will release “Politics of Religious Freedom” edited by Winnifred Sullivan (Indiana University Bloomington), Elizabeth Hurd (Northwestern University), Saba Mahmood (University of California, Berkley), and Peter Danchin (University of Maryland).  The publisher’s description follows:

In a remarkably short period of time, the realization of religious freedom has achieved broad consensus as an indispensable condition for peace. Faced with widespread reports of religious persecution, public and private actors around the world have responded with laws and policies designed to promote freedom of religion. But what precisely is being promoted? What are the cultural and epistemological assumptions underlying this response, and what forms of politics are enabled in the process?

The fruits of the three-year Politics of Religious Freedom research project, the contributions to this volume unsettle the assumption—ubiquitous in policy circles—that religious freedom is a singular achievement, an easily understood state of affairs, and that the problem lies in its incomplete accomplishment. Taking a global perspective, the more than two dozen contributors delineate the different conceptions of religious freedom predominant in the world today, as well as their histories and social and political contexts. Together, the contributions make clear that the reasons for persecution are more varied and complex than is widely acknowledged, and that the indiscriminate promotion of a single legal and cultural tool meant to address conflict across a wide variety of cultures can have the perverse effect of exacerbating the problems that plague the communities cited as falling short.

Canada’s Hobby Lobby Moment?

Supreme Court justicesIn a landmark decision on March 19, the Supreme Court of Canada decided Loyola High School v. Quebec.  At issue in the case was whether Loyola High School, a private Catholic school, should be required to teach Quebec’s “Ethics and Religious Culture” curriculum in a “neutral” manner.  Loyola sought an exemption from the neutrality requirement when teaching the Catholic faith and the ethics portion of the course.  Although the Supreme Court divided 4-3 with respect to the rationale, it unanimously held that Loyola should be granted an exemption.

As Barry Bussey explains below, this case is significant because the Court came very near to granting corporations religious freedom rights (read Bussey’s full article here).  The extent to which corporations enjoy religious freedom protections was, of course, a controversial issue decided last year by the American Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell.  In that case, the American Court held that RFRA grants religious exercise rights to certain for-profit corporations.  It seems that the Canadian Supreme Court may be following the American lead, albeit incrementally. Here is Bussey (footnotes omitted):

While all seven members of the Court were of the view that Loyola’s freedom of religion was infringed, the Court split in its reasoning 4-3 over the issues of religious corporate rights and the remedy in the case. Both opinions held that religious freedom is not only an individual right but also includes communal dimensions. This is significant. Justice Abella recognized that “individuals may sometimes require a legal entity in order to give effect to the constitutionally protected communal aspects of their religious beliefs and practice, such as the transmission of their faith.” But she did not think it was necessary to decide whether corporations enjoy religious freedom in their own right under s. 2(a) of the Charter to decide the case. Religious freedom, she maintained, must “account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief, and the deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation through communal institutions and traditions.”

Justices McLachlin and Moldaver were unequivocal in their acceptance of the Charter’s protection of the “communal character of religion”:

The individual and collective aspects of freedom of religion are indissolubly intertwined. The freedom of religion of individuals cannot flourish without freedom of religion for the organizations through which those individuals express their religious practices and through which they transmit their faith.

MacLachlin and Moldaver held that a corporation was entitled to religious freedom protection as long as it was constituted primarily for religious purposes and operated in accordance with those religious purposes.

Since a corporate organization does not demonstrate a sincere belief as an individual, it must show that its belief or practice is consistent with its purpose and its operation. Such beliefs and practises are more static and less fluid than those of an individual, which makes the inquiry into past practises and consistency of positions more relevant than it would be if the claimant were an individual. In this case, the beliefs and practises of Loyola were consistent and ought to be protected. The Minister’s refusal to accommodate those beliefs was in violation of the Charter right.

McLachlin and Moldaver’s decision forms a great foundation for a future case to clearly outline the boundaries of the religious freedom for religious corporate bodies. It is an incremental development in the right direction.

Hon. Kenneth Starr to Lecture at Touro on “The First Freedom: Religious Liberty in America”

The Hon. Kenneth Starr, President and Chancellor of Baylor University, will deliver a public lecture titled “The First Freedom: Religious Liberty in America” at Touro Law on Thursday, March 26, 2015 at 6:00 p.m. in the auditorium. The event is free and open to the public.

This event will be live streamed on March 26th at 6 p.m. Watch it here.

For more information, please contact: events@tourolaw.edu.

Movsesian at International Law & Religion Moot Court in Venice Next Week

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Home of the Marcianum in Venice

Next week, I’ll be in Venice for a new, three-day international law-and-religion moot court competition. Hosted by a research institute, the Fondazione Studium Generale Marcianum, the competition brings together law students from the US and Europe to argue a case on religious accommodation. I’ll be one of the American judges, along with Judge Richard Sullivan of the SDNY (and one of CLR’s Board members) and Professor William Kelley of Notre Dame Law School.

The organizers of the competition have come up with an interesting new approach. Two noted scholars, Silvio Ferrari of the University of Milan and Brett Scharffs of BYU, will offer an overview of the issues for the audience, and then the student teams will argue the case before two moot courts, one simulating the American Supreme Court and the other simulating the European Court of Human Rights. (The European judges are Louis-Leon Christians of the Catholic University of Louvain, Mark Hill of Cardiff University, and Renata Uitz of Central European University Budapest.) On the final day of the competition, each court will render a judgment and announce the winning team.

The Marcianum”s approach to the competition highlights the fact that law and religion issues have gone international. And it introduces students, especially American students, to the comparative legal method. It should be a wonderful learning experience and a lot of fun, and I’m grateful to the organizers, especially Professor Andrea Pin of the University of Padua, for inviting me. Any of our readers at the competition, please stop by and say hello. I’ll try to blog from Venice if occasion allows. Not sure you can blog from a gondola, though.

De Sanctis, “Churches, Temples, and Financial Crimes”

This May, Springer Publishing will release “Churches, Temples, and Financial Crimes: A Judicial Perspective of the Abuse of Faith” by Fausto Martin De Sanctis.  The publisher’s description follows:

This eye-opening volume examines ways in which religious institutions can be misused to mask illegal financial dealings, and steps law enforcement can take to combat these criminal activities. The chapters review legal rights and responsibilities of churches and the types of loopholes that can allow unscrupulous practices to flourish. This book offers local and global proposals for the study and practice of improving financial transparency for religious organizations, and assessing and curbing monetary crimes within their ranks. A sampling of criminal cases of financial wrongdoing by churches and temples spotlights the ingenuity involved in such scams as well as in the ongoing fight against them. Included in the coverage:

  • Religious freedom in the U.S and Brazilian constitutional orders
  • Government regulation of religious organizations
  • Criminal investigations and cases involving financial crimes practiced by and through religious institutions
  • International religious activities and legal cooperation for repatriation of assets
  • Payments through illegal and disguised means, and the misuse of churches, temples, and charitable organizations
  •  Proposals to improve the war against financial crimes within temples and churches

Its unique subject matter and depth of information make Churches, Temples, and Financial Crimes distinctly useful for professionals involved in efforts to curb this form of crime, particularly law enforcement personnel, prosecutors, and judges.

“The Changing Nature of Religious Rights Under International Law” (Evans et al., eds.)

This Month, Oxford University Press will release “The Changing Nature of Religious Rights Under International Law” edited by Malcolm Evans (University of Bristol), Peter Petkoff (Oxford University), and Julian Rivers (University of Bristol).  The publisher’s description follows:

Changing Nature of Religious RightsThe Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, as proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1981, is the only universal human rights instrument specifically focusing on religious intolerance and discrimination. However, recent years have seen increasing controversy surrounding this right, in both political and legal contexts. The European Court of Human Rights has experienced a vast expansion in the number of cases it has had brought before it concerning religious freedom, and politically the boundaries of the right have been much disputed. This book provides a systematic analysis of the different approaches to religious rights which exist in public international law.

The book explores how particular institutional perspectives emerge in the context of these differing approaches. It examines, and challenges, these institutional perspectives. It identifies new directions for approaching religious rights through international law by examining existing legal tools, and assesses their achievements and shortcomings. It studies religious organisations’ support for international human rights protection, as well as religious critique of international human rights and the development of an alternative religious ‘Bills of Rights’. It investigates whether expressions of members belonging to religious minorities can be considered under the minority right to culture, rather than the right to religion, and discusses the benefits and shortcomings of such a route. It analyses the reach and limits of the provisions in the 1981 Declaration, identifies ways in which the right is being eroded as a concept, and suggests new ways in which the right can be reinforced and protected.

Aroney on Freedom of Religion as an Associational Right

The latest issue of the University of Queensland Law Journal is devoted entirely to issues of federalism and freedom of religion in Australia.  One article by Professor Nicholas Aroney, Freedom of Religion as an Associational Right, is particularly informative.  You can read the article in its entirety here.

In his article, Professor Aroney argues that the religious freedom clauses of the Australian Constitution (section 116), which were modeled after the American First Amendment, should be interpreted to protect not only individual rights, but also communal or associational rights.  In support of this contention, Professor Aroney provides an impressive textual and historical analysis of section 116.  He further shows how this interpretation is in accord with international law.

According to Professor Aroney, correctly interpreting section 116 is of fundamental importance, because to interpret it as protecting merely individual rights has the potential to severely weaken religious freedom. Here is Professor Aroney (footnotes omitted):

Efforts to impose an individualistic view of human rights … continue to be made by groups such as the Discrimination Law Experts Group, who argue that the rights of religious organisations engaging in ‘public sphere activities’ should simply be trumped by the rights of individuals ‘to be treated in a non-discriminatory way.’ The Public Interest Law Clearing House and the Human Rights Law Resource Centre have argued similarly, maintaining that permanent religious exceptions to antidiscrimination laws facilitate and condone discrimination by protecting ‘traditional social structures and hierarchies’. Although the context is that anti-discrimination laws apply only in certain ‘public’ contexts, the reasoning is not so limited. These arguments are not unlike that of Stephen Macedo, who advocates that modern liberalism must ‘constitute the private realm in its image’ by forcing citizens ‘to observe its limits’ and ‘pursue its aspirations’. Such persons are to be actively coerced, Macedo candidly asserts, ‘to help ensure that freedom is what they want’, even in ‘their most “private beliefs”’.

 The underlying individualism of this line of argument has been made clear by Margaret Thornton, who has argued that although the ICCPR protects the right to exercise freedom of religion ‘in association with others’, this right not only has to be balanced against the competing rights to equal treatment and non-discrimination, but all such rights need to be understood, fundamentally, as the rights of human beings – not of corporations – and so it is a ‘logical fallacy to extrapolate from an individual’s private beliefs to an impersonal for-profit corporation’. Thornton’s argument shows the weakness of religious freedom rights if they are conceptualised in reductively individualistic terms. This is because one would have to show, first, that certain individuals have particular religious convictions that are legally protected and, second, that these same individual rights are being expressed through the religious corporation’s rules or practices. If religious rights are conceptualised as inherently ‘private’ in this sense, it will be that much more difficult to establish that such rights are really being exercised as private rights in various domains of ‘public’ or ‘quasipublic’ life. But on the contrary, as has been seen, international human rights principles, while certainly premised on the rights of the ‘human person’, are not exclusively concerned to protect only individual rights or only private expressions of religious conviction.

Another problem with individualised conceptions of human rights in this domain is that such rights, although originally conceived as rights against the state, can nonetheless ‘double up as rights against everyone’. Accordingly, as Julian Rivers has shown, there are some for whom it is not sufficient that an individual has a right of ‘exit’ from his or her religious community. Rather, there is evidence ‘of a growing assumption that everyone who wishes should be able to join any religious body’ and that ‘membership tests are suspect’. The underlying assumption, in other words, is that ‘the preservation of religious identity on the part of civil society groups needs justification against the individual who does not share that identity’, even though to adopt such an approach ‘is potentially destructive of the identity of [all] non-State collectivities’. For if any individual can decide whether he or she qualifies for membership of an organisation, no organisation will be able to maintain its distinctive identity.

This reductio ad absurdum suggests that a radical individualist conception of religious liberty is simply incompatible with the existence of religious associations and communities as distinguishable groups within a society. Against such a view, William Galston has observed:

 It is not obvious as an empirical matter that civil society organisations within liberal democracies must be organised along liberal democratic lines… A liberal policy guided … by a commitment to moral and political pluralism will be parsimonious in specifying binding public principles and cautious about employing such principles to intervene in the internal affairs of civil associations. It will rather pursue a policy of maximum feasible accommodation, limited only by the core requirements of individual security and civic unity. That there are costs to such a policy cannot reasonably be denied. It will permit internal associational practices (e.g. patriarchal gender relations) of which many disapprove. It will allow many associations to define their membership in ways that may be viewed as restraints on individual liberty … Unless liberty – individual and associational – is to be narrowed dramatically, however, we must accept these costs.

 A reductively individualist conception of religious freedom is obviously opposed to the capacity of such groups to determine their own conditions of membership, but an excessively narrow associational conception may also have this effect, for there are many social groupings and traditional communities, including religions, in which membership does not initially arise by deliberate choice but by birth and circumstance. Whether voluntaristic or otherwise, unless such associations and communities are going to be understood, following Thomas Hobbes, as ‘worms in the entrails’ of the body politic, we need to recognise, as Harold Laski argued, that they are ‘as real, as primary, and self-sufficing as the whole [society]’. This does not mean of course that communal religious rights must always prevail. But it does mean that they ought to be treated with the same respect as the rights of individuals. As such, from a liberal point of view, what is most crucial in order to protect individuals is not the right to join (or remain) within a group, but the right to exit it. On this approach, the question of the legitimacy of a law which regulates a religious association becomes one of determining what conditions, if any, must accompany an effective exit right, understood to include the rights to associate, disassociate or not associate with a particular religious community on terms offered by that community. Alternatively, from a more communitarian point of view, what matters is that a religious group genuinely benefits its members and does not inappropriately interfere with the legitimate interests of those outside the group. These are large questions, of course, which lie beyond the scope of this article, the point of which has been to establish the associational and communal dimensions of religious freedom as a matter of principle.

 

Subway Ads and Mental Maps

Many thanks to Mark Movsesian and Marc DeGirolami for letting me return with a couple of guest posts.

I’ve been intrigued by some recent posts on this blog and how they confirm my long-held view that the normative decisions we make with respect to the law’s treatment of religion are deeply intermeshed with cognitive choices we make — how we “see” and understand religion.  Religious phenomena don’t fit easily or self-evidently into the mental maps by which we divide the pieces of the secular world.  All we can do is approximate, and those approximations matter.

subway1Let’s begin with Mark’s fascinating and wonderfully observant recent post about an ad for the Marble Collegiate Church that he recently saw in a New York City subway.  The ad itself was unremarkable, touting Marble Collegiate as “Church the way you always hoped it could be.”  (Marble Collegiate itself is more remarkable, founded in 1628 as a Dutch Reformed congregation and serving in the 20th century as Norman Vincent Peale’s pulpit for some 50 years.)  But the ad included a prominent disclaimer form the MTA (the local transit agency) taking up the bottom third of its precious space: “This is a paid advertisement sponsored by Marble Collegiate Church.  The display of this advertisement does not imply MTA’s endorsement of any views expressed.”  What gives? Continue reading

Sarkissian, “The Varieties of Religious Repression”

This February, Oxford University Press will release “The Varieties of Religious Repression: Why Governments Restrict Religion” by Ani Sarkissian (Michigan State University).  The publisher’s description follows:

The Varieties of Religious RepressionReligious repression–the non-violent suppression of civil and political rights–is a growing and global phenomenon. Though most often practiced in authoritarian countries, levels of religious repression nevertheless vary across a range of non-democratic regimes, including illiberal democracies and competitive authoritarian states.

In The Varieties of Religious Repression, Ani Sarkissian argues that seemingly benign regulations and restrictions on religion are tools that non-democratic leaders use to repress independent civic activity, effectively maintaining their hold on power. Sarkissian examines the interaction of political competition and the structure of religious divisions in society, presenting a theory of why religious repression varies across non-democratic regimes. She also offers a new way of understanding the commonalties and differences of non-democratic regimes by focusing on the targets of religious repression.

Drawing on quantitative data from more than one hundred authoritarian states, as well as case studies of sixteen countries from around the world, Sarkissian explores the varieties of repression that states impose on religious expression, association, and political activities, describing the obstacles these actions present for democratization, pluralism, and the development of an independent civil society.