Tag Archives: Religious Freedom

Int’l Moot Court Competition in Law & Religion (Venice, March 2015)

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Nice Place for a Moot Court Competition

Here’s a great opportunity for law students. The Fondazione Studium Generale Marcianum in Venice (above) is hosting a new, international moot court competition on the subject of law and religion. The competition, which will take place in Venice next March, will draw teams of students from American and European law schools:

The goal of the Moot Court Competition is to bring together in Venice, for a limited period of time and in an intensive way (9-11 March 2015), a group of law school students in order to make them discuss a case with professional jurists. The students, coming from European and American Law Schools, will participate as teams. They will deal with a case at the intersection between law and religion, a central issue for the entire world and indeed a crucial theme for the Marcianum.

The initiative will bring together scholars and students of different backgrounds to have them address the very same case from two different standpoints. Some scholars will sit as the Supreme Court of the United States; some as the European Court of Human Rights. Teams will argue the same case before one of the two boards of judges. After a verdict, a roundtable will gather some scholars to debate the case as well as the way the two moot courts have addressed it.

This approach will give the students an opportunity to measure themselves with a case related to fundamental rights, developing reflective and argumentative skills and, at the same time, it will offer them, and the other participants, the occasion to highlight the different cultural points of view of the two Courts, enhancing the comparative perspective.

I’ll serve as one of the judges on the moot American court, along with Professor Bill Kelley of Notre Dame and Judge Richard Sullivan of the Southern District of New York. Professors Louis-Leon Christians (Catholic University of Louvain), Mark Hill (Cardiff University) and Renata Uitz (Central European University Budapest) will make up the European panel. Professor Silvio Ferrari (Milan) and Brett Scharffs (BYU) will serve as keynote speakers.

For details on the competition, as well as entry requirements, please click here.

Videos from the Rome Conference on International Religious Freedom and the Global Clash of Values

Here are the videos from June’s conference, “International Religious Freedom and the Global Clash of Values,” which the Center for Law and Religion co-hosted in Rome, together with the St. John’s Center for International and Comparative Law and the Faculty of Law at Libera Università Maria SS. Assunta (LUMSA):

Introduction by Michael Simons, Dean of St. John’s University School of Law

Introduction by Angelo Rinella, Dean of the Faculty of Law at LUMSA

Keynote by Thomas Farr, Director of the Religious Freedom Project at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center

Pasquale Annicchino, Research Fellow at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute

Heiner Bielefeldt, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief

Hon. Ken Hackett, United States Ambassador to the Holy See

Francisca Pérez-Madrid, Professor of Law at the University of Barcelona

Marco Ventura, Professor of Law at KU Leuven and the University of Siena

Roberto Zaccaria, Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Florence

Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, Professor of Law at Emory University School of Law

Olivier Roy, Joint Chair of the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute

Nina Shea, Director of the Center for Religious Freedom at the Hudson Institute

Conference Conclusion by Giuseppe Dalla Torre, Rector of LUMSA 

Conference on Mideast Christians (Washington, Sept. 9-11)

For readers in Washington: From September 9-11, an organization called “In Defense of Christians” will be hosting a major conference, the “IDC Summit 2014.” Participants include many church hierarchs from the Mideast, as well as members of Congress, prominent scholars, and other public figures:

The primary purpose of the Summit is to bring all members of the Diaspora together in a newfound sense of unity. Whether Orthodox or Catholic; Evangelical, Coptic or Maronite; Syriac, Lebanese, Chaldean or Assyrian – all Middle Eastern Christians will be called on to join together in solidarity.

This solidarity will strengthen advocacy efforts with policy makers and elected officials and make more palatable grassroots outreach to the American public. Thus united, Middle Eastern Christians will invite all people of good will to join the cause to defend the defenseless, to be a voice for those who are voiceless.

The survival of these historic Christian communities is not merely a moral imperative; it is in the interests of all nations and peoples of the West and the Middle East.

Looks very worthwhile. Details are here.

Fisher, Lemons & Mason-Brown, “Decoding Roger Williams”

This month, Baylor University Press releases “Decoding Roger Williams: The Lost Essay of Rhode Island’s Founding Father” by Linford D. Fisher (Brown University), J. Stanley Lemons (Emeritus Professor at Rhode Island College) and Lucas Mason-Brown (Graduate Student at Trinity College, Dublin).  The publisher’s description follows:

Decoding Roger WilliamsNear the end of his life, Roger Williams, Rhode Island founder and father of American religious freedom, scrawled an encrypted essay in the margins of a colonial-era book. For more than 300 years those shorthand notes remained indecipherable…

…until a team of Brown University undergraduates led by Lucas Mason-Brown cracked Williams’ code after the marginalia languished for over a century in the archives of the John Carter Brown Library. At the time of Williams’ writing, a trans-Atlantic debate on infant versus believer’s baptism had taken shape that included London Baptist minister John Norcott and the famous Puritan “Apostle to the Indians,” John Eliot. Amazingly, Williams’ code contained a previously undiscovered essay, which was a point-by-point refutation of Eliot’s book supporting infant baptism.

History professors Linford D. Fisher and J. Stanley Lemons immediately recognized the importance of what turned out to be theologian Roger Williams’ final treatise. Decoding Roger Williams reveals for the first time Williams’ translated and annotated essay, along with a critical essay by Fisher, Lemons, and Mason-Brown and reprints of the original Norcott and Eliot tracts.

“Religious Education and the Challenge of Pluralism” (Seligman ed.)

This October, Oxford University Press will release “Religious Education and the Challenge of Pluralism” edited by Adam B. Seligman (Boston University).  The publisher’s description follows:

Religious Education and the Challenge of PluralismThe essays in this volume offer a groundbreaking comparative analysis of religious education, and state policies towards religious education in seven different countries and in the European Union as a whole. They pose a crucial question: can religious education contribute to a shared public sphere and foster solidarity across different ethnic and religious communities?

In many traditional societies and even in what are largely secular European societies, our place in creation, the meaning of good and evil, and the definition of the good life, virtue, and moral action, are all primarily addressed in religious terms. It is in fact hard to come to grips with these issues without recourse to religious language, traditions, and frames of reference. Yet, religious languages and identities divide as much as unite, and provide a site of contestation and strife as much as a sense of peace and belonging Not surprisingly, different countries approach religious education in dramatically different ways. Religious Education and the Challenge of Pluralism addresses a pervasive problem: how can religious education provide a framework of meaning, replete with its language of inclusion and community, without at the same time drawing borders and so excluding certain individuals and communities from its terms of collective membership and belonging?

The authors offer in-depth analysis of such pluralistic countries as Bulgaria, Israel, Malaysia, and Turkey, as well as Cyprus – a country split along lines of ethno-religious difference. They also examine the connection between religious education and the terms of citizenship in the EU, France, and the USA, illuminating the challenges of educating our citizenry in an age of religious resurgence and global politics.

Trigg, “Religious Diversity”

This past June, Cambridge University Press released “Religious Diversity: Philosophical and Religious Dimensions” by Roger Trigg (University of Oxford).  The publisher’s description follows:

Religious DiversityShould we merely celebrate diversity in the sphere of religion? What of the social cohesion of a country? There is a constant tug between belief in religious truth and the need for respect for other religions. Religious Diversity: Philosophical and Political Dimensions examines how far a firm faith can allow for toleration of difference and respect the need for religious freedom. It elucidates the philosophical credentials of different approaches to truth in religion, ranging from a dogmatic fundamentalism to a pluralism that shades into relativism. Must we resort to a secularism that treats all religion as a personal and private matter, with nothing to contribute to discussions about the common good? How should law approach the issue of religious freedom? Introducing the relevance of central discussions in modern philosophy of religion, the book goes on to examine the political implications of increasing religious diversity in a democracy.

Annicchino on Religious Freedom as a (Non-)Priority in Italy and the EU

Our friend and former guest blogger Pasquale Annicchino (European University Institute) has a strong column on the extent to which religious freedom has, and has not, been a priority for the Italian government and the European Union in general over the last decade or so. He criticizes what he describes as vague sloganeering and lack of action, particularly in the context of the many grave threats posed by ISIS. The column is in Italian, but here is a bit of the original with a quick and dirty translation:

Quello che avviene in queste ore era largamente prevedibile, non era forse evitabile. Sono anni che i principali centri di ricerca, tra tutti il Pew Forum, segnalano la crescita di discriminazioni e persecuzioni ai danni di diverse minoranze religiose in varie zone del mondo. La reazione rispetto a questi dati è stata spesso quella di fare spallucce, di dire che poi, effettivamente, niente di così grave stava succedendo. Il governo italiano, tramite l’azione del Ministero degli Esteri, ha provato negli ultimi anni ad interessarsi al tema della libertà religiosa nel contesto della sua politica estera ma i risultati sono stati praticamente nulli.

[What is happening in these moments was largely foreseeable, though perhaps not avoidable. For years, the principal research centers, foremost among them the Pew Forum, signaled the growth of discrimination and persecution of diverse religious minorities in various regions of the world. The reaction to this data was frequently that of shrugging, or of then saying that, effectively, nothing very serious was happening. The Italian government, through the actions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has tried in the last years to become interested in the subject of religious freedom in the context of its foreign policy but the results have been almost nothing.]

Sniderman et al., “Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy”

This month, Princeton University Press released “Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy: Islam, Western Europe and the Danish Cartoon Crisis” by Paul Sniderman (Stanford University), Michael Peterson, Rune Slothuus, and Rune Stubager (all from Aarhus University, Denmark).  The publisher’s description follows:

Paradoxes of Liberal DemocracyIn 2005, twelve cartoons mocking the prophet Mohammed appeared in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, igniting a political firestorm over demands by some Muslims that the claims of their religious faith take precedence over freedom of expression. Given the explosive reaction from Middle Eastern governments, Muslim clerics, and some Danish politicians, the stage was set for a backlash against Muslims in Denmark. But no such backlash occurred.

Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy shows how the majority of ordinary Danish citizens provided a solid wall of support for the rights of their country’s growing Muslim minority, drawing a sharp distinction between Muslim immigrants and Islamic fundamentalists and supporting the civil rights of Muslim immigrants as fully as those of fellow Danes—for example, Christian fundamentalists. Building on randomized experiments conducted as part of large, nationally representative opinion surveys, Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy also demonstrates how the moral covenant underpinning the welfare state simultaneously promotes equal treatment for some Muslim immigrants and opens the door to discrimination against others.

Revealing the strength of Denmark’s commitment to democratic values, Paradoxes of Liberal Democracy underlines the challenges of inclusion but offers hope to those seeking to reconcile the secular values of liberal democracy and the religious faith of Muslim immigrants in Europe.

Conference: “Liberty and Justice for All” (October 2-5)

The Christian Legal Society will be hosting its national conference, “Liberty and Justice for All,” at the Boston Park Plaza on October 2-5:

Lawyers, law students, professors, judges and friends are invited to join us October 2-5 in Boston. We are excited that we will be hearing from great speakers like Professor Robert George, Dr. Russell Moore, Andy Crouch and John Stonestreet, as well as a wonderful religious liberty panel. And of course, we will continue to offer practical workshops and CLEs covering numerous areas of the law: from estate planning to running a Christian law firm to human trafficking to employment law and ethics, just to name a few.

Details are here

Is More Less? Or is More More?

The titular questions refer to the issue of the reduction in the strength and integrity of rights by the increase in their number and scope. The issue is: do you weaken rights by multiplying them and broadening them? Or instead, as the size and scope of government itself expands, is the concomitant expansion of rights (in number and coverage) necessary simply to keep pace?

The best defense of the view that more is less with respect to the First Amendment belongs to Philip Hamburger. Hamburger’s key claim is that as one expands the scope of the rights protected under the First Amendment, one weakens those rights inasmuch as the degree to which one conceives of them as something approaching inviolable (though never actually inviolable) decreases. Where the scope of rights is limited, it requires some really and truly compelling rival concern to overcome the right. But as the scope of the right increases, so too does the need to “balance” the right against rival interests.

That particular “more-is-less” claim depends on the scope given to a protected right. A related “more-is-less” claim focuses on the expansion of the number of protected rights. That’s the claim Steve Smith makes in a hot off the presses post at the Liberty Law blog (if you haven’t seen it, Steve is writing up a storm over there). Steve writes:

[S]uppose we relax our standards, and relax them again, and expand our thinking, and fine-tune our sensibilities and sensitivities, to the point that anything that any favored constituency really, really wants comes to be viewed as a “right.” In other words, we follow the path that the Warren Court– and, truth be told, the Burger Court, and to a significant extent the Rehnquist Court, and even in some respects the Roberts court– followed. Or we heed the prescriptions of political theorists and constitutional scholars to codify as “rights” all manner of privacy and dignitary and equality and self-fulfillment interests. Perhaps we use as a guide Martha Nussbaum’s list of essential human “capabilities” without which it is ostensibly impossible to be “truly” or “really human.” These would include things like the use of senses, imagination, and thought; bodily health; and bodily integrity (including “opportunities for sexual satisfaction”). Without “opportunities for sexual satisfaction,” your life is not “really human”; so surely you must have a right to such opportunities.

Under this impulse, rights would multiply like rabbits. But given some such vastly expanded inventory of rights, it will be impossible to give all of these rights…“compelling interest” protection. For one thing, government would thereby be effectively paralyzed, because just about anything government might do will run up against one of more of the newly articulated “rights.” For another, some of these diffuse rights are sure to conflict with others. For still another, government’s rights-oriented obligation now is not just to leave people alone in certain respects, but affirmatively to supply people with lots of desired things: and in a world of scarcity there is only so much that government can supply (or can mandate that employers, say, must supply)….

Now, to say that something is a right is basically to say that it should be taken into account, or given “weight,” in the balancing of competing interests that goes into the formulation and assessment of laws and government policies. Government should not infringe the “right”– unless, of course, there is some good reason to do so.

Though this is strictly speaking a claim about how the increasing number of rights weakens the protection of such rights, the connection to the issue of scope is evident. Take the RFRA rule that only those religious burdens that are “substantial” trigger the law’s protection. A religious burden isn’t enough. It has to be a really, really big, terrible burden. The more-is-less claim is that by broadening the scope of protection and increasing the number of things that we protect in the name of religious freedom, we’ve now got to have some mechanism to limit the kinds of claims that merit protection in the first place. So we superimpose the language of “substantiality” and we talk about the shifting of burdens and the balancing of interests because we’ve watered down the basic right so much that we don’t even really know what it is that counts as the right in the first place any longer.

But there is another side to the story. That side is admirably represented by John Inazu in this paper–More is More: Strengthening Free Exercise, Speech, and Association. John argues, to the contrary, that the thesis of “rights confinement” as giving strength to existing rights does not account for the ways in which cultural developments can affect the scope of rights. In the First Amendment context, some explanations for weakening of the right of religious freedom include decline in popular support for the right, the ideological cabining of the right (as, John argues, has happened to religious freedom but not to the freedom of speech), and (most importantly I believe) changing cultural views about what constitutes a government interest–that is, in what government ought to be interested in at all.

Here I want to note an overlapping position in the more-is-less and more-is-more views. They seem opposed. But I wonder. Both recognize that a major part of the difficulty is not the individual right in question and our feelings about it, but the expanding scope of what is deemed a concern of the state. Both, that is, locate the crux of the more/less debate in changing societal perspectives on the fundamental nature of government and its role in the lives of the citizen.

If that is true, let me offer a point of agreement with John Inazu, and then perhaps a point of difference. The point of agreement is that in a society in which the government takes on more and more of a place and a role in the life of the citizenry, the protection of rights becomes a zero sum game. More is more, because every inch gained is a gain for the right, and every inch lost is a gain for the state. The point of difference is that if this is so, then one should expect that with time it will begin to affect all rights, very much including the right of free speech. That is, the particular explanations for the more is more thesis that affect religious freedom (loss of the right’s prestige in popular sentiment) will eventually hit other freedoms too. That is because the key issue is not evolving cultural perceptions of the right’s strength and ambit, but evolving cultural perceptions of the strength and ambit of the state’s proper power.