Tag Archives: Religious Exemptions

Morse on Navigating the Penalties in the Affordable Care Act

Edward A. Morse (Creighton U. School of Law) has posted Lifting the Fog: Navigating the Penalties in the Affordable Care Act. The abstract follows.

This article provides an analysis and critique of tax penalties affecting employers and individuals in the Affordable Care Act. After an overview of the Act and its intended role in addressing problems in the health insurance system, the article turns to examine the employer and individual mandates, along with the requirement of minimum essential coverage. It argues that behavioral effects of these provisions are unlikely to achieve the desired policy outcomes. Moreover, the failure to accommodate conscience exemptions for employers and citizens with objections to contraceptive coverage likewise erects a barrier to achieving the desired policy goal of expanded coverage. Finally, the article briefly touches on the problems associated with state exchanges and their implications for employers and citizens seeking health insurance coverage. An appendix shows hypothetical computations affecting an employer decision to shift employees to exchanges rather than to continue employer-provided coverage.

And from the Introduction: Continue reading

Hintze on Mandatory Influenza Vaccinations for Healthcare Employees and Religious Exemptions

Drew D. Hintze (Martinez Law Group, P.C., Denver) has posted Mandatory Influenza Vaccination Policies in Colorado: Are Healthcare Employees with Religious Conflicts Exempt? The abstract follows.

Colorado is attempting to reduce the spread of influenza in healthcare facilities from healthcare personnel to patients.  Colorado’s Department of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”) and the Colorado Hospital Association (“CHA”) have each approved initiatives endorsing the need for healthcare organizations in the state to develop influenza vaccination policies to increase vaccination coverage among healthcare personnel.  As mandatory influenza vaccinations become more commonplace in healthcare organizations nationwide, concerns have arisen regarding the circumstances in which a healthcare worker may seek an exemption to an employer-mandated immunization.  This article discusses mandatory influenza vaccination policies in Colorado and the legal issues healthcare employers should consider when an employee seeks an exemption from an influenza vaccination based on religious beliefs.

Nelson on the Free Exercise Rights of Institutions

James David Nelson (Columbia University Law School) has posted Conscience, Incorporated. Nelson’s essay evaluates the ability of corporations and other institutions to claim exemptions from the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate under the Free Exercise Clause. The abstract follows.

Do business corporations have free exercise rights? This question has become critically important in recent challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s so-called “contraception mandate.” A host of businesses selling ordinary goods and services claim that they cannot be compelled to provide employees with insurance that covers contraception. Courts have divided over whether corporations can assert rights of conscience, and existing theoretical accounts fail to provide guidance on this question.

This Article offers a new normative framework for evaluating corporate claims of conscience. Drawing on theories of conscience and collective rights, it develops a “social theory” of conscience that explains how individual moral identity is formed within associations and, consequently, how the social structure of those associations can support institutional claims for legal exemptions.

The social theory of conscience has direct implications for free exercise doctrine. For an institution to assert a valid claim, it must be a constitutive community, such that individual members regard the collective as intimately tied to their sense of self. Some institutions, like churches and other religious organizations, fit comfortably in this category. But the legal, social, and economic norms that govern modern business practice pervasively undermine the formation of tight personal connections to for-profit corporations and thereby erode the normative basis for institutional legal exemptions. Free exercise doctrine should therefore resist corporate claims to exemptions from the law.

Oleske on Lukumi Babalu Aye

James M. Oleske Jr. (Lewis & Clark Law School) has posted Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws. The abstract follows.

Twenty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, uncertainty reigns in the lower courts and among commentators over the issue of constitutionally compelled religious exemptions. Despite the Court’s general disavowal of such exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith, Lukumi appeared to breathe life into a potentially significant exception to Smith. That exception – which this Article calls the “selective-exemption rule” – provides that religious exemptions may still be required by the Free Exercise Clause when the government has selectively made available other exemptions to a law.

This Article addresses the key unresolved questions about the scope of the selective-exemption rule and challenges the received reading of the leading circuit court decision interpreting the rule. Relying heavily upon that reading, prominent religious liberty advocates have been pressing for a remarkably broad Continue reading

Holy Sepulcher May Close Over Unpaid Water Bill

I’ve posted before about legal issues surrounding the Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem, which most Christians hold to be the site of Jesus’ crucifixion, burial, and resurrection. The building  is shared among several Christian communions, all of whom accept, more or less, the so-called “Status Quo,” a compilation of rules and customs dating to Ottoman times that governs possession and use of the church. I hadn’t seen this anywhere in the scholarship, but it seems that the Status Quo may also cover payment of the church’s water bill.  According to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, which has the greatest share of rights in the church and, apparently, responsibility for utilities, the Status Quo exempts the church from water bills. According to Hagihon, the Israeli utility that supplies the church with water, the Patriarchate is incorrect. Hagihon says Israeli law does not exempt religious organizations from water bills and that the church owes roughly $2 million. Last week, Hagihon obtained a court order freezing the Patriarchate’s bank account until payment is made. The Patriarchate says that, with its bank account frozen, it cannot fund day to day operations and that it will have to close the church.  Cooler heads undoubtedly will prevail, but for the moment there’s an impasse. I don’t know whether any of the other communions have offered to chip in, but the Greek Patriarchate may not want them to do so. Under the Status Quo, paying to maintain any part of the property can be an assertion of the right of possession — and the Patriarchate surely does not want to create a precedent suggesting that other communions have greater rights in the church.

Corbin on the Contraception Mandate

Caroline Mala Corbin (University of Miami School of Law) has posted The Contraception Mandate. The abstract follows.

Under the new health care regime, health insurance plans must cover contraception. While religious employers are exempt from this requirement, religiously affiliated employers are not. Several have sued, claiming that the “contraception mandate” violates the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This essay explains why the contraception mandate violates none of them.

Clergy Libel Suits and the Limits of Hosanna-Tabor

At my panel at the Federal Bar Council retreat this past weekend, someone from the audience asked the following question. After Hosanna-Tabor, last term’s Supreme Court decision endorsing the ministerial exception to the employment discrimination laws, what happens to tort claims by clergy against their churches? For example, what if a priest sues his church for defamation? Would Hosanna-Tabor bar such an action?

It turns out this is a real, live case. The New York Times reports that a defrocked Catholic priest, Charles Kavanaugh, has sued the Archdiocese of New York for defamation. Kavanaugh alleges that the archdiocese libeled him when it stated in a recent press release that a church tribunal had found him guilty of multiple counts of sexual abuse. Kavanaugh says this statement is untrue. The details aren’t really important here. The question is whether Hosanna-Tabor bars Kavanaugh’s suit.

The short answer appears to be no. The Hosanna-Tabor Court expressly declined to decide whether the ministerial exception barred “actions by employees alleging . . . tortious conduct by their religious employers.” So the question remains open. Would the logic of the ministerial exception bar a claim like Kavanaugh’s? It wouldn’t seem so. Kavanaugh does not seek to be returned to the ministry or even damages for wrongful dismissal. If he wins, a victory would have absolutely no effect on what Hosanna-Tabor says is the principal concern underlying the ministerial exception: a church’s ability to select those who will lead it and express its message.  Of course, if Kavanaugh’s claim turns on some matter of religious doctrine, for example, whether he was espousing authentic Catholic teaching, that would be different. Civil courts are not going to get entangled in that sort of dispute. But courts should be able to decide a straight-up defamation claim on neutral principles of law. I don’t think Hosanna-Tabor poses a problem here.

Zelinsky on Religious Tax Exemptions and Entanglement

Edward A. Zelinsky (Cardozo School of Law) has posted Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the Religious Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the Fica and Self-Employment Taxes. The abstract follows.

In Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Geithner, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) argues that Code Section 107 and the income tax exclusion that section grants to “minister[s] of the gospel” for parsonage allowances violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This case has important implications for a new federal law mandating that individuals maintain “minimum essential” health care coverage for themselves and their dependents. That mandate contains two religious exemptions. One of these exemptions incorporates a pre-existing religious exemption from the federal self-employment tax. These sectarian exemptions raise the same First Amendment issues as does the Code’s exclusion from gross income of clerical housing allowances.

I ultimately find unpersuasive the indictment of Section 107 as constitutionally entangling. For the same reasons, I also conclude that the religious exemptions of the Social Security taxes and of the individual health mandate pass First Amendment muster. In the modern world, extensive contact between tax systems and religious institutions is unavoidable. Whether religious entities and actors are taxed or exempted, there are inevitable tensions between the contemporary state and sectarian institutions and their personnel. Whether religious entities and actors are taxed or exempted, there are no disentangling alternatives, just imperfect trade-offs between different forms of entanglement.

Thus, Section 107 and the exclusion from gross income it grants to clerical recipients of housing and parsonage allowances are constitutionally permitted, though not constitutionally required, responses to the problems of entanglement inherent in the relationship between modern government and religion. Similarly, the Code’s sectarian exemptions from the individual health care mandate and from the FICA and self-employment taxes are acceptable, though not obligatory, means under the First Amendment of managing the inevitable contacts and tensions between the contemporary state and the religious community.

However, as a matter of tax policy, the exclusion of Section 107(2) for cash parsonage allowances stands on weaker ground than does the exclusion of Section 107(1) for in-kind housing provided to “minister[s] of the gospel.” The taxation of such cash allowances, in contrast to the taxation of housing provided in-kind, does not involve problems of valuation or of taxpayer liquidity and is thus more practicable as a matter of tax policy.

Giving the Ministerial Exception a Bad Name

Over at PrawfsBlawg, our friend Paul Horwitz notes an interesting piece in the New York Times yesterday on doings at the Trinity Broadcast Network, an extremely successful Christian cable channel. Well, “doings” is perhaps too polite. TBN, which advocates the so-called “Prosperity Gospel,” has received many millions of dollars over the years in donations from the faithful — $93 million in 2010 alone. An insider now claims that much of the money has gone to fuel the lavish lifestyle of TBN executives, particularly the network’s founders, the husband-and-wife team of Paul and Janice Crouch. I won’t go into the details, except to say that the portrait is one of high-spending, low-rent excess, and that the allegations come from one of the Crouch’s own granddaughters, who other family members say was the real sponger.

IRS regulations prohibit “excess compensation” for executives of non-profit organizations. According to the Times, though, TBN has been able to avoid scrutiny by relying on the ministerial exception. TBN has allegedly ordained “dozens of staff members . . . including chauffeurs, sound engineers, and others,” as ministers, thus allowing TBN to give them rent-free luxury “parsonages” and to avoid paying Social Security taxes on their salaries. TBN’s lawyer defended the network’s actions, arguing that the hundreds of ordained employees, including performers at a TBN-affiliated religious theme park, had experienced a true religious vocation.

Who knows how these allegations will sort out? One issue that seems sure to arise, though, is fraud. Some of the Court’s church autonomy cases suggest that fraud is a limitation on the ministerial exception, though the cases don’t really develop the idea. If the IRS were to go after TBN, it could argue that the ordinations for company workers without any theological or pastoral training were phony. Questioning such ordinations would obviously raise free exercise concerns, though, and at least one legal expert the Times quotes thinks it won’t happen: “absent clear fraud, the government is not going to touch that.”

Commonweal on the Bishops’ Religious Freedom Statement

Over the past week, I’ve written about criticism from the Catholic right of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops’ recent statement on religious freedom. Of course, there’s also been criticism from the Catholic left. This week, Commonweal has a negative editorial about the bishops’ statement. More in sorrow than in anger, Commonweal maintains that the statement veers into political partisanship. The  bishops’ simplistic, one-sided language, the editorial complains, makes them sound more like Republican party operatives than pastors. Young people already are turning away from organized religion because it seems too political and conservative on social issues. Surely the bishops do not want to exacerbate that trend?

I wonder about this criticism. It’s true that the bishops’ statement highlights the Obama Administration’s contraceptives mandate. The mandate is the first on the list of threats to religious freedom the bishops identify, and surely served as the prime motivation for their statement. But the second item on the list is state anti-immigration laws, like the recent Alabama measure forbidding assistance to undocumented immigrants. In criticizing these laws, the bishops are hardly mouthing GOP talking points. Republican politicians often favor such measures, while the Obama Administration has filed a lawsuit challenging the Alabama law.

Even with respect to the contraceptives mandate, the bishops could be forgiven for saying that they didn’t start this fight. The bishops surely knew that objecting to the HHS mandate would have the effect of highlighting the Church’s position on contraception, and that this position is unpopular, particularly with Millennials. But what choice was there? It was the Obama Administration that issued the mandate during an election year. For that matter, it was the Obama Administration that argued this Term in Hosanna-Tabor that the religion clauses did not even apply to a church’s decision to fire a minister, a position that a unanimous Court characterized as “remarkable.” If it’s inappropriately partisan for religious organizations to respond when government takes steps like these, then religious organizations can never defend themselves in public debate. That may be a good thing from a spiritual point of view, but I don’t think it’s a result Commonweal would approve.