Tag Archives: Religious Accommodation

Shah on Religious Accommodations

Prakash Shah (Queen Mary, University of London School of Law) has posted Asking About Reasonable Accommodation in the Context of Religious Universalism. The abstract follows.

Interviews conducted with leading actors in England asking a range of questions about religious diversity and the legal framework and, in particular, about reasonable accommodation, helped identify a number of areas of concern. There was some doubt about whether specific legal provision should be brought in to guarantee reasonable accommodation. However, there was broad support for having the principle adopted in the practice of employers, while some preferred the current informality rather than the principle being enforced through litigation. None of the respondents came up with illustrations outside of Judaism, Christianity or Islam. The results are consistent with recent critical studies showing that the assumption in social sciences that religion is a universal has been imported from theology. Religion-based questions only pick out certain phenomena specific to some cultures and an inevitable skew is created when asking such questions because they only make sense within an Abrahamic religious framework. While enabling the identification of some aspects of culture considered to merit reasonable accommodation on grounds of religion, the results also pose questions about the adequacy of current, standard research methodologies which assume that religion is a universal.

Mooney on the Hajj and Reasonable Accommodation Under Title VII

Matthew P. Mooney (Student at Duke U. School of Law) has posted Between a Stone and a Hard Place: How the Hajj Can Restore the Spirit of Reasonable Accommodation to Title VII. The abstract follows.

Although section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that employers reasonably accommodate their employees’ religious practices and beliefs, many commentators acknowledge that the spirit of reasonable accommodation has not been realized because courts have drastically limited the scope of employers’ duty. This may be especially true for Muslims, who, according to a 2012 study, are roughly half as likely to prevail in free-exercise and religious-accommodation lawsuits as are non-Muslim claimants. One of the central tenets of Islam, the hajj, poses significant challenges for Muslim employees seeking accommodation under Title VII. Because accommodating the hajj will almost always impose more than a de minimis cost on employers, a court is unlikely to find that Title VII requires employers to accommodate a Muslim employee’s decision to complete the pilgrimage.

This Note attempts to articulate a new method for expanding Title VII’s protection of employees’ religious beliefs and practices. Specifically, this Note argues that increased involvement by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Department of Justice in hajj-accommodation cases offers a promising approach to developing a more balanced accommodation doctrine, or at least to  realigning the scales so that they are not tilted so heavily in favor of employers. Despite clear precedent limiting an employer’s duty to accommodate, increased intervention by the federal government in Title VII hajj-accommodation cases has the potential to shift the conception of reasonable accommodation. Though the government must pick and choose the cases in which to intervene, hajj-accommodation cases present an opportunity to further the dual purposes of the government’s Title VII enforcement authority to implement the public interest as well as to bring about more effective enforcement of private rights. Intervention can restore the spirit of accommodation to section 701(j) and give employers more of an incentive to accommodate their employees’ religious obligations.

Breda on Accommodation of Sharia Law in Italy

Vito Breda (Cardiff Law School & Australian National University) has posted Sharia Law in Catholic Italy: A Non-Agnostic Model of Accommodation. The abstract follows.

The Italian Constitution and its interpretation by the Constitutional Court have led to the development of a model of accommodation of religious practices that seeks to balance a commitment to promoting religious pluralism whilst, at the same time, maintaining the neutrality of state institutions. What is distinctive about this quasi-neutral constitutional stance is the commitment to reducing the discrepancies between the legal and religious effects of key life decisions (e.g. the decision to get married). I call this stance positive secularism. In this essay, I would like to show that, thus far, positive secularism has been particularly effective in accommodating the demands of Muslim immigrants (Pacini 2001). For instance, some aspects of the Sharia law, such as marriage (including some effects of polygamous marriage) and divorce (including some effects of unilateral divorce), are already recognized by Italian international private law. The second stage for the accommodation of Sharia law in Italy is likely to be the recognition of Islam as one of Italy’s official religions. Recognition will increase the level of the Islamic communities’ autonomy and will allow for the automatic recognition of some aspects of Sharia law. In February 2010, the Italian government established the Committee for Islam, composed of representatives of Italian Islamic communities, within the Ministry of Interior Affairs. In the recent past, these types of dialogues between institutions and religious representatives have been the proxy for the official recognition of nine faiths in Italy. Waldensian Evangelical Church, the World Assemblies of God Fellowship, the Evangelical Baptist Church, the Lutheran Baptist Church, the Apostolic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, the Adventist Church, the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of Italy, Hebrew Communities of Italy. The chapter is divided into two sections, which is preceded by an introduction, and followed by a conclusion. The first section will discuss the judicial introduction of Sharia law via the procedure of Italian international law. The second section will explain the advantages of the recognition process and the reasons that have prevented Islamic communities from benefiting from it.

Oleske on Lukumi Babalu Aye

James M. Oleske Jr. (Lewis & Clark Law School) has posted Lukumi at Twenty: A Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws. The abstract follows.

Twenty years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, uncertainty reigns in the lower courts and among commentators over the issue of constitutionally compelled religious exemptions. Despite the Court’s general disavowal of such exemptions in Employment Division v. Smith, Lukumi appeared to breathe life into a potentially significant exception to Smith. That exception – which this Article calls the “selective-exemption rule” – provides that religious exemptions may still be required by the Free Exercise Clause when the government has selectively made available other exemptions to a law.

This Article addresses the key unresolved questions about the scope of the selective-exemption rule and challenges the received reading of the leading circuit court decision interpreting the rule. Relying heavily upon that reading, prominent religious liberty advocates have been pressing for a remarkably broad Continue reading

Quraishi-Landes on What American Judges Do with Islamic Family Law in Their Courtrooms

Asifa Quraishi-Landes (U. of Wisconsin Law School) has posted Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are Greatly Exaggerated: What American Judges Really Do with Islamic Family Law in Their Courtrooms. The abstract follows.

American rule of law has always considered issues of accommodations of religious minorities seeking to follow rules that differ from American secular legal norms. In other words, Sharia is by no means the first religious law to be presented in American courts. Two centuries of case law involving religious-based requests from American Catholics, Jews, Mormons, Native Americans, and others has resulted in several established policies and practices that American judges use to adjudicate requests for consideration of religious law. In short, requests for consideration of religious law are balanced with constitutional and legislative principles, using judicial tools such as comity, public policy, and unconscionability. Because many Americans are unaware of this established practice, the anti-Sharia campaign has been able to create a concern that judicial consideration of Sharia-based claims from Muslim American litigants is compromising American law and values. The case law, however, shows a different picture. Judicial treatment of Sharia requests is not threatening the American rule of law, it is an illustration of it. As with requests from other American religious groups, sometimes Sharia requests win, and sometimes they don’t. Reasonable minds differ over whether the courts get it right each time. But in every case, the job of the judge is a careful balancing of rights against each other, not an automatic trumping of religious practice by secular law or vice versa.

The campaign to ban Sharia in the United States appears to be directed at two different alleged threats: (1) that Sharia will take over American law, and (2) that judicial accommodation of Muslim religious practices is eroding our secular rule of law. The first is a non-issue: there is no real chance that Sharia will replace American law or our Constitution. But the second is worth talking about. It asks a question crucial to the nature of our secular constitutional democracy: Can we legally accommodate a diversity of religious legal practices among our citizens and, if so, with what limits? I will address one aspect of this question by summarizing in Part II how Islamic family law is currently accommodated in American courtrooms today and discussing in Part III why this does not threaten women’s rights or our American rule of law. In Part IV, I consider the global and domestic implications of Muslim American tribunals serving the dispute resolution needs of American Muslims. Part V concludes.

ECtHR to Issue Ruling in UK Religious Freedom Cases Tomorrow

Tomorrow, a chamber of the ECtHR will release its judgment in Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom. As we explained back in September, when the cases were argued, the ECtHR’s ruling could have a major impact on religious freedom jurisprudence under the European Convention on Human Rights:

The applicants in these cases argue that UK courts failed to protect their Article 9 and Article 14 rights by allowing their employers to discipline them for practicing Christianity. Chaplin, a nurse, and Eweida, a British Airways employee, were forbidden by their employers from wearing cross necklaces at work. Ladele, a public registrar, lost her job when she declined, on the ground of religious conviction, to register same-sex civil partnerships. McFarlane, a psychotherapist, lost his job when he expressed doubts as a Christian about the morality of homosexual conduct.

CLR Forum will have an analysis of the judgment later this week.

Update on English Sabbath-Observance Case

An update on an earlier post about an English appellate court decision on the right of Christian employees to decline to work on Sundays. The decision was released to the public last week, and it turns out that initial press reports were a bit misleading.

The case involved Ms. Celestina Mba, a caregiver in a children’s home who wished to abstain from work on Sundays for religious reasons. When her employer told her she would have to work Sundays, Ms. Mba sued for religious discrimination. A lower court held for the employer and, last month, an  appellate court affirmed.

Under English law, employers can require Christian employees to work Sundays  if there is a legitimate need and the work requirement is proportionate to that need. Press reports, particularly this one in the Telegraph,  made it seem like the appellate court had ignored that balancing test and held categorically that Sunday observance is not a core Christian belief and that Christians could be required to work.

As it turns out, the appellate court did discuss the balancing test. The facts of the case were these. The center had accommodated Ms. Mba for two years, but had ultimately determined that allowing her to stay home Sundays put too great a strain on other staff and threatened to disadvantage the children. These were surely legitimate business needs. And the center had only required Ms. Mba to work some Sundays — roughly two out of three. This seemed a proportionate response to that need.

So where did the language about Sunday observance not being a core Christian belief come in? The lower court had reasoned that, because many Christians do not feel an obligation to abstain from Sunday work, abstention could not be considered a core Christian belief. The appellate court criticized the lower court’s language on this point, but basically agreed with the lower court’s reasoning. In determining whether a work requirement were proportionate to a legitimate business need, the appellate court explained, one had to consider what percentage of a faith community the requirement would affect. If the requirement would affect a large segment of the community, that would suggest that the requirement were disproportionate. If, by contrast, the requirement would affect only a small percentage, that would suggest the opposite. Here, the appellate court reasoned, in requiring Sunday work, the center could take into account the fact that many Christians would have no objection at all to working Sundays.

This is all a bit complicated, the way legal opinions often are. Frank Cranmer at the Law and Religion UK blog has a good description of the opinion, if you’re interested in more details. The bottom line is that the appellate court’s decision was narrower and more subtle than the Telegraph’s report conveyed.

Why did the Telegraph get it wrong? The appellate court’s judgment was announced on December 13, but the opinion was not released to the public until January 10. The Telegraph reported the story at the end of December, before the opinion was available. Apparently the reporter relied on lawyers’ accounts of the case.

Muslim Parents Sue Greek Orthodox School for Banning Head Scarves

Here’s an unusual case. Muslim parents are suing a public school in south London for refusing to allow their nine-year old daughter to wear a head scarf to class. That’s not so unusual in itself. Law school casebooks are full of cases in which parents sue public schools for failing to accommodate their children’s religious practices. What makes this case unusual is that the public school in question, St. Cyprian’s in Croydon, is an Orthodox Christian school.

To Americans, faith-based public schools are unfamiliar. As Ashley Berner explains here, however, such schools are common in England. According to the official government website, roughly 7000 “maintained,” as in publicly maintained, “faith schools” exist, the large majority of which are affiliated with the Church of England. St. Cyprian’s is affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church — it is the only Greek Orthodox school in England, in fact. As a faith-based school, St. Cyprian’s may give priority in admission to Greek Orthodox students, though by law it must admit students of other faiths if places remain unfilled. As far as I can tell, like other public schools, St. Cyprian’s may adopt its own school uniform policy, subject to very broad guidelines.

I’m not sure how the English courts will resolve this dispute. But the whole situation is puzzling and it’s a shame things have come so far. It’s odd, in the circumstances, that the parents would insist on a Greek Orthodox school for their daughter. If it’s so important to them that she maintain Muslim practices, why put her in a school in which a different religion is pervasive? Isn’t that a bit unreasonable, and unfair to her? The school says the parents petitioned to send their daughter to St. Cyprian’s, and that the school’s rule against head scarves was explained to them before she matriculated. St. Cyprian’s has very high academic ratings; perhaps that explains why the parents are so eager to have their daughter attend. Still, it’s all rather odd.

On the other hand, the school’s position is puzzling as well. There’s nothing in Orthodoxy that forbids the wearing of head scarves; in fact, some Orthodox women wear head scarves in church. Perhaps St. Cyprian’s is concerned that a visible non-Orthodox presence would dilute the school’s identity. That’s a valid concern, in my opinion. And I can understand how school officials might think they’ve been sandbagged by the parents in this case. If the parents knew about the rule against head scarves before their daughter matriculated, why are they complaining now? But the law requires St. Cyprian’s to admit non-Orthodox students if it has places for them, and it doesn’t seem tenable to admit such students and then forbid them from wearing their religious attire. Anyway, mightn’t it be better, in the circumstances, to allow this student to wear her head scarf? What would demonstrate more effectively the essential nature of Christianity — its willingness, even joy, in serving everyone and anyone?

Griffith-Jones (ed.), “Islam and English Law”

This January, Cambridge University Press will publish Islam and English Law: Rights, Responsibilities and the Place of Shari’a edited by Robin Griffith-Jones (The Temple Church, London). The publisher’s description follows.

Former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams triggered a storm of protest when he suggested that some accommodation between British law and Islam’s shari’a law was ‘inevitable’. His foundational lecture introduced a series of public discussions on Islam and English Law at the Royal Courts of Justice and the Temple Church in London. This volume combines developed versions of these discussions with new contributions. Theologians, lawyers and sociologists look back on developments since the Archbishop spoke and forwards along trajectories opened by the historic lecture. The contributors provide and advocate a forward-looking dialogue, asking how the rights of all citizens are honoured and their responsibilities met. Twenty specialists explore the evolution of English law, the implications of Islam, shari’a and jihad and the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights, family law and freedom of speech. This book is for anyone interested in the interaction between religion and secular society.

Wilson on The Calculus of Accommodation

Robin F. Wilson (Washington and Lee U. School of Law) has posted The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and other Clashes Between Religion and the State. The abstract follows.

This Article considers a burning issue in society today—
whether, and under what circumstances, religious groups and individuals should be exempted from the dictates of civil law. The “political
maelstrom” over the Obama administration’s sterilization and contraceptive coverage mandate is just one of many clashes between religion
and the state. Religious groups and individuals have also sought religious exemptions to the duty to assist with abortions or facilitate same-sex marriages. In all these contexts, religious objectors claim a special
right of entitlement to follow their religious tenets, in the face of equally compelling claims that religious accommodations threaten access and
may impose significant costs on others. Legislators and other policymakers have struggled with how to advance two compelling, and at
times conflicting, values—access and religious liberty. This Article examines, and responds to, a number of “sticking points” voiced by legislators
about a qualified exemption for religious objectors to the duty to facilitate same-sex marriages—concerns that bear an uncanny resemblance
to reasons why some believe the Obama administration should not yield
further on the contraception mandate. This Article maintains that religious accommodations qualified by hardship transform what could be a zero- sum proposition into one in which access and religious freedom can both be affirmed.