Tag Archives: Religion and Education

Datla, “The Language of Secular Islam”

Last month, the University of Hawaii Press published The Language of Secular Islam: Urdu Nationalism and Colonial India by Kavita Datla (Mount Holyoke College). The publisher’s description follows.The Language of Secular Islam

During the turbulent period prior to colonial India’s partition and independence, Muslim intellectuals in Hyderabad sought to secularize and reformulate their linguistic, historical, religious, and literary traditions for the sake of a newly conceived national public. Responding to the model of secular education introduced to South Asia by the British, Indian academics launched a spirited debate about the reform of Islamic education, the importance of education in the spoken languages of the country, the shape of Urdu and its past, and the significance of the histories of Islam and India for their present.

The Language of Secular Islam pursues an alternative account of the political disagreements between Hindus and Muslims in South Asia, conflicts too often described as the product of primordial and unchanging attachments to religion. The author suggests that the political struggles of India in the 1930s, the very decade in which the demand for Pakistan began to be articulated, should not be understood as the product of an inadequate or incomplete secularism, but as the clashing of competing secular agendas. Her work explores negotiations over language, education, and religion at Osmania University, the first university in India to use a modern Indian language (Urdu) as its medium of instruction, and sheds light on questions of colonial displacement and national belonging.

Grounded in close attention to historical evidence, The Language of Secular Islam has broad ramifications for some of the most difficult issues currently debated in the humanities and social sciences: the significance and legacies of European colonialism, the inclusions and exclusions enacted by nationalist projects, the place of minorities in the forging of nationalism, and the relationship between religion and modern politics. It will be of interest to historians of colonial India, scholars of Islam, and anyone who follows the politics of Urdu.

Rosen on the Liberal Case for Educational Accommodation of Religious Groups

Apropos of Erwin Chemerinsky’s illiberal proposal to close down all private and religious schools, here is a liberal argument for accommodation of the educational preferences of (some) religious and other “perfectionist” groups: The Educational Autonomy of Perfectionist Religious Groups in a Liberal State, by Mark Rosen.  The influence of Rawls on Rosen’s work is very substantial, but Rosen departs from Rawls in several interesting ways.  Arguments like Rosen’s are not the only way to think about issues of educational pluralism (and it seems to me that Rosen’s piece has nothing to say about the educational autonomy of non-perfectionist groups, such as one might find at your typical secular private school).  For a different approach, see this earlier post on Ashley Berner’s essay.  But, like Berner’s essay, Rosen’s is a serious and thoughtful attempt to grapple with these problems.  Here’s the abstract.

This Article draws upon, but reworks, John Rawls’ framework from Political Liberalism to determine the degree of educational autonomy that illiberal perfectionist religious groups ought to enjoy in a liberal state. I start by arguing that Rawls mistakenly concludes that political liberalism flatly cannot accommodate Perfectionists, and that his misstep is attributable to two errors: (1) Rawls utilizes an overly restrictive “political conception of the person” in determining who participates in the original position, and (2) Rawls overlooks the possibility of a “federalist” basic political structure that can afford significant political autonomy to different groups within a single country. With these insights, I argue that some, though not all, religious Perfectionists are consistent with a stable liberal polity, and explain why foundational Rawlsian premises require that Perfectionists be accommodated to the extent possible.

My ultimate conclusions are that liberal polities ought to grant significant autonomy to those illiberal groups that satisfy specified conditions, and that the autonomy of such “eligible” illiberal groups is subject to two further constraints, which I call “well-orderedness” and “opt-out.” The autonomy to which eligible Perfections are entitled includes the authority to educate their children in a way that provides a fair opportunity for the groups to perpetuate themselves. The constraint of well-orderedness, however, permits the State to impose educational requirements that facilitate peace and political stability. Accommodating eligible illiberal groups, subject to these constraints, is an instantiation of liberal commitments, not a compromise of liberal values.

Chemerinsky Urges Compulsory Public Education

I am not attending the AALS conference this year, but I thought to reproduce (with permission) a message on a constitutional law listserv that I’m on, written by Pepperdine law professor Mark Scarberry.  Mark reports his impressions of a presentation by UC Irvine law dean Erwin Chemerinsky:

Dean Chemerinsky stated, if my memory is correct, that the only way to deal with educational disparities and the problem of (de facto) resegregation of public schools is to require all children to attend public schools and to require that they do so within districts made up of metropolitan areas. That would include suburbs along with inner cities, so that racial integration by busing will be possible. He stated that Milliken v.  Bradley should be overruled, so that suburban school districts could be, for these purposes, combined with inner city school districts to allow integration. He also stated that Pierce v. Society of Sisters should be overruled, so that all children could be required to attend these racially mixed public schools. As I understand it, he thinks that only if whites are required to put their children in the same schools as those attended by racial minorities will there be the political will to provide the resources so that minority students can receive a quality education. He said that parents who wanted to have their children receive religious education or other forms of education could have them receive it after school or (I believe he said) on weekends.

I don’t think he meant to say that the right of parents to control their children’s upbringing and education would be eliminated, but that the right should be overridden by a compelling state interest in providing an adequate education to all students. It wasn’t clear to me whether he wanted all the work to be done by the courts, with courts holding that the Constitution requires that all students attend schools on such a metropolitan-area racially-mixed basis (either as a matter of equal protection or as a matter of a fundamental right to an adequate public education) — or, alternatively, that the Court should allow Congress or states to impose this scheme.

Since it impinges on various law and religion issues, I thought this proposal might be of interest to CLR Forum readers — the legal implications of compulsory public education and the overruling of Milliken v. Bradley and/or Pierce v Society of Sisters would be substantial, and it is notable that someone of Chemerinsky’s status in constitutional law is suggesting this.  There is certainly a pressing need to take seriously the problem of grossly undereducated children in urban and poor areas, and the consequences of Milliken were pretty awful, though what exactly is to be done about that is obscure, at least to me (this is not my area of expertise).  But this proposal seems, as Mark later notes in his message, rather illiberal.  It also doesn’t quite do justice to the reasons for attending a religious school, or any private school for that matter (admittedly, my own educational experience has been entirely within such schools).

I also wonder whether Dean Chemerinsky, as part of his proposal, would be favorably disposed to overruling McCollum v. Board of Education, in which the Court in 1948 held that it violated the Establishment Clause for public schools to release students for religious instruction on school premises, taught by teachers outside the public school system.  It seems to me that Dean Chemerinsky would probably approve of Zorach v. Clausen (but maybe not, because the released time program was being conducted during regular school hours, let alone all of that “Supreme Being” stuff), where the Court in 1952 approved released time religious instruction off school premises.  In conjunction with the (constitutionally mandated?) elimination of private schools, does he envision a larger role for the state (financial or otherwise) in religious education?  If not, after private and religious schools are closed down by the state (whether by judges or by legislators), where would students receive the education that their parents, and they, actually want?

Davis & Miroshnikova, “The Routledge International Handbook of Religious Education”

This August, Routledge published The Routledge International Handbook of Religious Education edited by Derek Davis (Baylor University) and Elena Miroshnikova (Tula Leo Tolstoy State Pedagogical University). The publisher’s description follows.

How and what to teach about religion is controversial in every country. The Routledge International Handbook of Religious Education is the first book to comprehensively address the range of ways that major countries around the world teach religion in public and private educational institutions. It discusses how three models in particular seem to dominate the landscape.

Countries with strong cultural traditions focused on a majority religion tend to adopt an “identification model,” where instruction is provided only in the tenets of the majority religion, often to the detriment of other religions and their adherents. Countries with traditions that differentiate church and state tend to adopt a “separation model,” thus either offering instruction in a wide range of religions, or in some cases teaching very little about religion, intentionally leaving it to religious institutions and the home setting to provide religious instruction. Still other countries attempt “managed pluralism,” in which neither one, nor many, but rather a limited handful of major religious traditions are taught. Inevitably, there are countries which do not fit any of these dominant models and the range of methods touched upon in this book will surprise even the most enlightened reader. Continue reading

Larry Gatlin and Jonathan Rauch on Christian Groups at Vanderbilt

Now there’s a pairing you don’t see everyday. Country music star Larry Gatlin and Brookings Institute scholar Jonathan Rauch both weigh in on Vanderbilt’s denial of recognition to Christian groups in this new video from the Foundation for Individual Rights in Higher Education (FIRE). Vanderbilt denied the groups recognition under its all-comers policy, which requires groups to open their leadership positions to all students, even students who disagree with the groups’ principles. In CLS v. Martinez (2010), the Supreme Court held that such a policy is consistent with the First Amendment. Many American universities have such a policy, but not all; recently, for example, SUNY-Buffalo decided to allow the local chapter of the Intervarsity Christian Fellowship to require its leaders to affirm the group’s beliefs. The FIRE video is a very good introduction to the topic; unfortunately, Vanderbilt apparently did not accept FIRE’s invitation to present its side of the story.

Seventh Circuit: Holding a High School Graduation in a (Richly Iconographically Religious) Church Violates the Establishment Clause

The Seventh Circuit has come down with a ruling that holding a public school graduation in a church violates the Establishment Clause when the church has an indeterminate number of religious icons and other material which run afoul of the standards that the Supreme Court has encrusted on the Establishment Clause.  It was undisputed that the choice to hold the graduation in the church was made for the sake of convenience, price, and accommodation of the large number of students, and not for any religious reason.  It was also undisputed that no reference was made to religion during the graduation ceremony.

Do read Judge Ripple’s sensible, moderate, and absolutely convincing dissent.  But by far the most pungent lines appear in Judge Posner’s dissent — and boy are there a lot of them.  Taking the prize: 

The best that a judge of determined neutrality faced with a case such as the present one can do is to be guided by Gibbon’s aphorism (from chapter 2 of the Decline and Fall) that “the various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman world, were all considered by the people, as equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally useful.” For “the Roman world” substitute “the United States” and for “the magistrate” substitute “the judge” and one has the right starting point for the analysis of this case. The judge should not be concerned with the truth or falsity of any religious faith but should regard the various faiths as “equally useful” from the standpoint of society, in recognition of the importance that Americans attach to religion, the diversity and intensity of their religious beliefs and observances, and the bitterness and strife that the government’s taking sides among competing faiths would engender.

Other memorable lines from Judge Posner’s dissent:

Continue reading

Review of Steven Green’s Book

I’ve got a review up over at The New Republic on line of Steven Green’s fine book, The Bible, the School, and the Constitution: The Clash that Shaped Modern Church-State Doctrine (OUP 2012).

Religion and Education in Northern Ireland

Christopher McCrudden (Queens University Belfast, University of Michigan Law School) has posted Religion and Education in Northern Ireland: Voluntary Segregation Reflecting Historical Divisions.  The abstract follows.

Since the foundation of Northern Ireland (‘NI’) in 1920, the issue of control over primary and secondary education has been a source of significant tension between its two main ethno-religious communities as well as between each and the NI government. Education in Northern Ireland is organised differently compared with the rest of the United Kingdom and several of its ‘unique features’ arise out of the particular form of its political and religious sensitivities concerning education. This chapter is structured as follows. First, I shall outline the features of the governance of education in the NI model. Secondly, I shall attempt to explain briefly why these features came about. Thirdly, I shall consider research that has attempted to understand the effects of the model on the religious background of pupils in different schools. Fourthly, I shall address the role of teachers in this model. Fifthly, I shall consider issues relating to curriculum and collective worship. Sixthly, the crucial issue of school funding will be examined. Finally, I shall consider the prospects for the model in the future by considering pupil opinion on the structure of schooling and I shall explain how this model relates to political developments in Northern Ireland generally.

 

Tennessee Governor to Veto Vanderbilt Bill

Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam has announced that he will veto the bill, discussed here, that would ban “all-comers” policies, such as the one at Vanderbilt University, that require student groups to open their leaderships to all students, including students who reject the groups’ core beliefs. Although he disapproves such policies, Haslam said, he thinks it’s ”inappropriate for government to mandate the policies of a private institution.”