Tag Archives: Hinduism

Is Yoga Constitutional?

Last month, I  wrote about a controversy surrounding the White House’s inclusion of a yoga garden in its annual Easter Egg Roll. The problem is this: yoga is a Hindu spiritual practice. Arguably, therefore, state-sponsored yoga is a religious endorsement that violates the Establishment Clause under existing Supreme Court case law.

Yoga Class at Encinitas School (New York Times)

It turns out that very issue is being litigated this week in a California  court. The Encinitas Union School District has introduced yoga as part of the phys ed program in elementary schools. Some parents object that the program highlights yoga’s spiritual elements and amounts to religious indoctrination. The school argues that it has eliminated religious references and that what remains is nothing more than an enriched gym class. An Indiana University religious studies professor who testified at trial demurs. She says that that it would be odd, from a Hindu perspective, to separate yoga’s physical and spiritual elements.

Under Supreme Court precedent, government can separate “cultural” from “religious” messages and promote the former. That’s why official Christmas displays with reindeer and elves survive constitutional scrutiny, but not solo nativity scenes. The logic is that the secular decorations swamp the religious message and ensure that passersby don’t think the government is endorsing Christianity, as opposed to Christianity’s cultural accretions.

This logic has saved some Christmas displays, but offended some Christians. To them, the Supreme Court’s reasoning suggests an unfortunate hostility to their religion: Christmas is acceptable in the public square only if its spiritual associations are diluted. To be sure, the Supreme Court  has said only that official displays must avoid religious associations, but people rarely compartmentalize things so logically. Culture often follows law.

So here’s a question: if official yoga programs are allowed on the theory that they have been scrubbed of religious associations, will pious Hindus object?Will people start demanding to keep the yoga  in yoga?

Does Yoga Violate the Establishment Clause?

Here’s another item in the occasional series, “Does it violate the Establishment Ganesh with cupcakeClause?” whose last entry concerned werewolves and crusaders.  Given the state of Establishment Clause doctrine on this particular set of issues, I’m confident that I’ll be getting lots of material for it.

This story reports that the President (or those close to him, or something) really goes in for yoga, and so the President’s Council on Fitness, Sports, and Nutrition is making a pro-yoga pitch, which included the introduction of a yoga garden during this year’s Easter Egg Hunt where one could receive yoga pedagogy.

But there is a problem.  Some believe that the official state promotion of yoga–in public school, for example–violates the Establishment Clause because it is tantamount to the government “picking religious winners and losers.”  The story reports:

[The lawyer representing objecting families] said many Americans who practice yoga want to be viewed as spiritual but not religious. However, claims that yoga is a mere physical exercise that doesn’t cross the line to Eastern religious beliefs and practices are dubious at best . . . . [Y]oga poses are worshipful acknowledgements of Hindu deities and have been shown to have a religiously transformative impact.

“Let’s be honest, if the White House was actively promoting a Christian-based exercise program, I am confident there would be a huge public outcry and they would change the program. But because yoga is based in Eastern mysticism, which is not well understood, many tend to try to disingenuously downplay its religious aspects[.]”

It’s hard to argue with the government’s response: whatever your religious beliefs, everybody benefits from “stretching, strength-building, and breathing.”  But the best line belongs to the judge assigned to hear the case, who is himself a devout yoga practitioner (or is that yogi?).  When questioned about his yoga activities, he is said to have responded: “Does anybody have a problem with that? . . . .If you think there’s something spiritual about what I do, that’s news to me.”

Easter Egg Hunt, take note.

Urscheler on Legal Traditions in Nepal

Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (Swiss Institute of Comparative Law) has posted Innovation in a Hybrid System: The Example of Nepal. The abstract follows.

The Nepali legal tradition is a legal hybrid in many regards. Nepal was not colonised by a Western state, and the Hindu legal tradition therefore dominated all areas of law until the middle of the 20th century. Since the 1950s there has been a strong influence of Indian common law. It is probably for this reason that comparative classifications that include Nepal see the legal system as a mixture of common law and customary law. However, other mixtures mark the Nepali legal tradition. French law inspired the ruler in the 19th century, and that influence can still be found in the formal law. In addition, the plurality of Nepalese society made it necessary to provide space for different customary regimes to coexist with the formal Hindu law. When it comes to innovations within the legal system, including international law, the different ingredients interact.

In family-related matters, the case-law of the Nepali Supreme Court illustrates the confrontation between international legal standards and the traditional rules. The Supreme Court has referred to the culturally conditioned discrimination against women and called for a thorough (political) analysis in order to eliminate discrimination without a radical change of culture. In the area of discrimination against homo- and transsexuals the Supreme Court took a more innovative approach. It remains to be seen, however, if such a change is effective beyond the courtroom.

In the area of private financial compensation for wrongs, the formal (written) Nepali law does not have a general concept of tort. Compensation is generally integrated within the ambit of criminal law. Field research indicates that it would be possible to resort to existing customary principles of compensation rather than to the relatively complex common law of torts favoured by some Nepali scholars. However, this approach might not be without difficulty, as it might imply admitting the “superiority” of the customary practices of ethnic groups of lower standing in society.

The example of Nepal shows that innovation in a hybrid system is often marked by the difficulty of – at least apparently – contradictory elements and layers of the legal system. There might be a tendency towards choosing the dominant or the most easily accessible solution. This paper suggests that the hybrid nature of the legal system offers opportunities that could be taken in order to achieve effective change and appropriate solutions.

Balkaran & Dorn on Violence in the Vālmiki Rāmāyana

On September 3, the Journal of the American Academy of Religion published Violence in the Vālmı̄ki Rāmāyana : Just War Criteria in an Ancient Indian Epic by Raj Balkaran (University of Calgary) and A. Walter Dorn (Royal Military College of Canada and Canadian Forces College). The abstract follows.

When is armed force considered justified in Hinduism? How do Hindu legitimizations of warfare compare with those of other religions? The Just War framework, which evolved from Roman and early Christian thought, stipulates distinct criteria for sanctioning the use of force. Are those themes comparable to the discourse on violence of ancient India? This article examines the influential Sanskrit epic Vālmıki Rāmāyana in order to broach these questions. This analysis demonstrates the presence in the ancient work of all seven modern Just War criteria—namely (1) Just Cause, (2) Right Intent, (3) Net Benefit, (4) Legitimate Authority, (5) Last Resort, (6) Proportionality of Means, and (7) Right Conduct. This study also shows the extent to which the criteria and the larger discourse in the Vālmıki Rāmāyana are distinctly couched within Indic ethical parameters, drawing particularly upon the moral precept of ahim (nonviolence). This article identifies both similarities and differences between the epic’s criteria for warfare and those of the Just War framework. By comparing representations of violence in the Vālmıki Rāmāyana to modern Western legitimizations of force, this study advances the inclusion of Hindu thought into the global discourse on the ethics of war and peace.

Rocher, “Studies in Hindu Law and Dharmaśāstra”

This month, Anthem Press will publish Studies in Hindu Law and Dharmaśāstra by Ludo Rocher (University of Pennsylvania) and edited by Donald R. Davis, Jr. (University of Wisconsin – Madison). The publisher’s description follows.

The main sources for an understanding of classical Hindu law are the Sanskrit treatises on religious and legal duties, known as the Dharmaśāstras. In this collection of his major studies in the field, Ludo Rocher presents analytical and interpretive essays on a wide range of topics, from general themes such as the nature of Hindu law and Anglo-Hindu law to technical matters including word studies and text criticism. Rocher’s deep engagement with the language and worldview of the authors in the Dharmaśāstra tradition yields distinctive and corrective contributions to the field, which are informed by knowledge both of the Indian grammatical tradition and of Roman and civil law.

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Censoring the Internet in India

I wrote in February about India’s crackdown on religiously offensive speech on the internet. In response to lawsuits in Indian courts, Facebook and Google have removed images that allegedly cause offense to Hindus, Muslims, and other religious communities. In The Atlantic this week, Max Fisher writes that the censorship issue is again getting attention, with the US State Department calling on India to respect the “full freedom of the internet.” Fisher wonders, though, whether India doesn’t have reason to clamp down. A long-standing dispute between Hindus and Muslims in Assam has recently reignited, fueled by rumors on the internet that each side was planning to massacre the other. Eighty people have already been killed, and 300,000 displaced. Religious hate speech on  the internet hasn’t caused this crisis, of course, but it has contributed to it. What is the Indian government to do? Fisher writes:

Walter Russel Mead, writing on the ongoing crisis, called India’s long-running communal tensions “the powder keg in the basement.” With the already-dangerous risk of ethnic combustion heightened by a population with easy access to rumors and an apparent predisposition to believing them, maybe that powder keg justifies Indian censorship. Or maybe it doesn’t; free speech is its own public good and public right, and, in any case, censoring discussion of such sensitive national issues could make it more difficult for India to actually confront them. This is just one of the many difficult questions that Indian leaders will grapple with as hundreds of thousands of their citizens flee their homes, chased out by “a swirl of unfounded rumors.” I don’t envy them.

Roy, “Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia”

Here’s something at the intersection of religion and statecraft about the Hindu tradition of the philosophy of war (compare, e.g., just war theory in the Catholic tradition): Hinduism and the Ethics of Warfare in South Asia: From Antiquity to the Present (CUP 2012) by Kaushik Roy (Jadavpur University).  The publisher’s description follows.

This book challenges the view, common among Western scholars, that precolonial India lacked a tradition of military philosophy. It traces the evolution of theories of warfare in India from the dawn of civilization, focusing on the debate between Dharmayuddha (Just War) and Kutayuddha (Unjust War) within Hindu philosophy. This debate centers around four questions: What is war? What justifies it? How should it be waged? And what are its potential repercussions? This body of literature provides evidence of the historical evolution of strategic thought in the Indian subcontinent that has heretofore been neglected by modern historians. Further, it provides a counterpoint to scholarship in political science that engages solely with Western theories in its analysis of independent India’s philosophy of warfare. Ultimately, a better understanding of the legacy of ancient India’s strategic theorizing will enable more accurate analysis of modern India’s military and nuclear policies.

Gottschalk, “Religion, Science, and Empire”

In October, Oxford University Press will publish Religion, Science, and Empire: Classifying Hinduism and Islam in British India by Peter Gottschalk (Wesleyan University). The publisher’s description follows.

Peter Gottschalk offers a compelling study of how, through the British implementation of scientific taxonomy in the subcontinent, Britons and Indians identified an inherent divide between mutually antagonistic religious communities.

England’s ascent to power coincided with the rise of empirical science as an authoritative way of knowing not only the natural world, but the human one as well. The British scientific passion for classification, combined with the Christian impulse to differentiate people according to religion, led to a designation of Indians as either Hindu or Muslim according to rigidly defined criteria that paralleled classification in botanical and zoological taxonomies. Continue reading

Cinar et al., “Visualizing Secularism and Religion”

A year ago, I participated in a wonderful symposium on secularism in the  contemporary Middle East, sponsored by the Oasis Foundation in Venice. The conversations at the symposium made clear that secularism is very much a contested term, particularly in majority Muslim societies, which often view secularism as a Western, even Christian concept. The University of Michigan Press has published an interesting-looking new book on the subject by Alev Cinar (Mugla University, Turkey), Srirupa Roy (Göttingen), and Maha Yahya (UN), Visualizing Secularism and Religion: Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, India (2012). The publisher’s description follows.

Over the past two decades secular polities across the globe have witnessed an increasing turn to religion-based political movements, such as the rise of political Islam and Hindu nationalism, which have been fueling new and alternative notions of nationhood and national ideologies. The rise of such movements has initiated widespread debates over the meaning, efficacy, and normative worth of secularism. Visualizing Secularism and Religion examines the constitutive role of religion in the formation of secular-national public spheres in the Middle East and South Asia, arguing that in order to establish secularism as the dominant national ideology of countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, and India, the discourses, practices, and institutions of secular nation-building include rather than exclude religion as a presence within the public sphere. The contributors examine three fields—urban space and architecture, media, and public rituals such as parades, processions, and commemorative festivals—with a view to exploring how the relation between secularism, religion, and nationalism is displayed and performed. This approach demands a reconceptualization of secularism as an array of contextually specific practices, ideologies, subjectivities, and “performances” rather than as simply an abstract legal bundle of rights and policies.

Deb on Hindu Child Marriage Law

Shakti Deb (KIIT Law School) has posted A Critical Analysis of Child Marriage Law in India with Special Reference to Hindu Law. The abstract follows.

Child Marriage is considered to be a violation of human rights, according to UNICEF, it represents perhaps the most prevalent form of sexual abuse and exploitation of girls. In many parts of the world especially underdeveloped countries parents give consent to child marriages hoping that it would benefit the girl both economically and socially. This practice is especially common in rural areas and amongst economically backward families, the daughter is married off at an young age to relieve the family from her economic responsibilities.

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