At the Center’s Conference on International Religious Freedom in Rome, at which Pope Francis gave the keynote address. In addition to His Holiness, that’s Center Director Mark Movsesian, Associate Director Marc DeGirolami, and St. John’s Law School Dean Michael Simons (L-R).
The Center for Law and Religion at St. John’s Law School is pleased to announce its third biennial Colloquium in Law and Religion, scheduled for Spring 2016. This seminar invites leading law and religion scholars to make presentations to a small audience of students and faculty.
The following speakers have confirmed:
February 1: Brett G. Scharffs (Brigham Young University School of Law)
February 16: Robin Fretwell Wilson (University of Illinois School of Law)
February 29: Robert P. George (Princeton University)
March 14: Mark Tushnet (Harvard Law School)
April 4: Justice Samuel A. Alito (United States Supreme Court)
April 18: Elizabeth H. Prodromou (Boston University & Tufts University Fletcher School of Diplomacy)
Topics will be announced at a future date.
For more information or if you would like to attend the sessions, please contact the colloquium’s organizers, Marc DeGirolami (firstname.lastname@example.org) and Mark Movsesian (email@example.com). For information about past colloquia, please click here, Spring 2012, and here, Spring 2014 (hosted with Villanova Law School).
Mark and I are just back from the Libertas Conference at Villanova Law School. It was an extremely edifying period of thought, reflection, and fellowship with a wonderful group of lawyers, political theorists, philosophers, historians, and journalists, including Steve Smith, Damon Linker, Christopher Tollefsen, Elizabeth and David Corey, Tuan Samahon, and Gerald Russello, among many others. Rick Garnett, Zak Calo, and I were fortunate enough to moderate the sessions over a period of three days.
The sessions really broke down into four general categories: (1) genealogical accounts of church and state in modernity (including readings by Brad Gregory and Mark Lilla, as well as by Steve Smith); (2) historical studies of the specifically English and American experience of church and state (including readings by Stuart Banner and Michael McConnell), (3) comments on the projects of cultural Christianity and secularism (John Courtney Murray, Robert Louis Wilken, and Pope Benedict XVI were on the agenda); and (4) diagnoses of and prognoses for religious freedom in the United States (here some of the readings were decidedly inferior as they included some of my recent work, but also much better material by Rick Garnett and Paul Horwitz).
The conference was organized by Michael Moreland with his usual grace, generosity, and aplomb. The participants’ comments and insights will influence my own thinking and writing for a while, in ways I hope to note by and by. But here’s one initial thought having to do with scholarly method. There are of course many different ways to make scholarly contributions in law: argument in the service of changing doctrine, synthesis of a body of law to arrive at a new insight, normative pleas for turns or returns to various positions having assertedly desirable political ramifications, studies of empirical states of affairs, and so on. But my own view–helped along and shaped by the participants at the conference (as well as by posts like this one)–is that we are at the beginning of the flowering of an interesting period of long-view, retrospective, critical diagnostic scholarship in law and religion and constitutional law more broadly. Not everybody will be interested in this sort of approach, of course. Others in the field have different projects and different objectives. But at least for me, this is an invigorating thought.
Mark and I are at lovely Villanova University School of Law for the next few days, participating in the religious freedom component of the Libertas Project, sponsored by the Templeton Foundation and organized by our old friend, Professor Michael Moreland. We’ll have more to report as the discussion gets underway.
On Thursday, I’ll be appearing on a panel at the annual ICON-S conference on Public Law, to be held this year at New York University. The conference is sponsored by the International Journal of Constitutional Law, and draws scholars from around the world. My panel, “The Foundation of an Uncertain Law,” will discuss Cambridge’s new collection of commentary on the jurisprudence of Pope Benedict XVI, Pope Benedict XVI’s Legal Thought: A Dialogue on the Foundation of Law (Cartabia & Simoncini eds. 2014). Other panelists include Michel Rosenfeld (Yeshiva), Ran Hirschl (Toronto), and John Garvey (Catholic University of America). The panel will be moderated by Sabino Cassese, formerly of the Italian Constitutional Court. CLR Forum readers at the conference, please stop by and say hello!
The Dignitatis Humanae Colloquium will be held from October 30 through November 1 in Norcia, Italy.
December 2015 marks the 50th anniversary of the most controversial document of the Second Vatican Council, the ‘Declaration on Religious Freedom’, Dignitatis Humanae. Ever since its promulgation, it has been the subject of prolonged and often impassioned debate. What precisely does it teach? What is its authority? How can it be reconciled with the Church’s teaching about the kingship of Christ and the duties of Catholic statesmen? Scholars from all over the world will be meeting in Norcia this autumn, in the presence of Cardinal Raymund Burke, to discuss these vital questions.
Apropos of Mark’s excellent post below, our friend Tom Berg has the details here of a very interesting conference at Cambridge University this fall concerning patent law and religion. Looks fascinating. I’ve reproduced the conference description below.
With the explosion of genetic technology and the drive to access and make use of genetic resources, the issues surrounding the patenting of living things and living material–human, animal, and plant–have become tremendously complex and important. What is the line between patentable scientific creations and unpatentable features of nature? What effects do patents on human genes, or on genetically modified crops, have on people in poverty or in developing countries? What is a fair allocation of indigenous genetic resources among traditional peoples and multinational corporations? What role should moral objections to particular technologies play in determining whether they can be patented? And what do religious insights have to offer on these legal, moral, and social questions?
I was very pleased to take part in a conference yesterday at Columbia Law School honoring my old master, Kent Greenawalt, and 50 years of his teaching and writing. Together with Paul Horwitz and Andy Koppelman, I was on a panel involving church and state. Subsequent panels followed on free speech and legal interpretation (chiefly statutory interpretation, which has been Kent’s primary focus historically). I took the liberty of saying something about criminal law as well, yet another area in which Kent has made major contributions, including as one of Hebert Wechsler’s colleagues in revising the Commentaries to the general part of the Model Penal Code. Paul has a nice post on the event.
Here’s a quote of Kent’s I found in a piece written about a decade ago: “Criminal law scholars are much more divided about desirable approaches than they were in the 1950s, and even among centrist scholars, no one person now has the distinctive stature that Herbert Wechsler enjoyed.” Some of my comments considered and adapted that general thought in the context of law and religion scholarship today, where it is also apt for various reasons.
Just three additional notes from the panels. First, on the speech panel, there was some interesting discussion about the plausibility of the Austinian idea of performative utterances (a concept used and applied by Kent in this book)–whether the distinction between performative and non-performative speech holds up, or whether all utterances are in some way performative and so we need instead to focus on the quality of the performative speech at issue (threats of violence are different for regulatory purposes than a comment at an academic conference, though there may not be a big difference for performance purposes). Second, on the legal interpretation panel, Fred Schauer criticized the notion that “public meaning” cannot be ascertained without recourse to someone’s intentions (I believe Larry Alexander among others holds something like the opposite view), though of course one need not subscribe to original public meaning in order to believe that public meaning is coherent. Third, I had never quite realized (though I guess I should have) just how much sympathy Jeremy Waldron has for textualism. Jeremy talked about a seminar in statutory interpretation that he and Kent ran in the late 1990s and it was clear how much they differed in their respective approaches (and how much they enjoyed the debate). Jeremy’s talk included 12 ways in which legislation is qualitatively different from other group expression. One of the 12 was that legislation is “dangerous,” which I thought was an interesting thing to say.
The International Center for Law and Religion Studies and the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion will host the 2015 Oxford Conference next month. This year’s theme is “Magna Carta and Freedom of Religion or Belief.” Here’s a description:
The International Center for Law and Religion Studies, in cooperation with the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, is hosting its 2015 Oxford Conference, June 21-24, 2015, at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford. The event will begin with dinner on Sunday evening and continue with presentations on Monday addressing the conference theme, Magna Carta and Freedom of Religion or Belief. On Tuesday, participants will visit Runnymede and locations in London, with dinner at Inner Temple, featuring keynote speaker Rt Hon Lord Igor Judge. On Wednesday, all participants are invited to join, once again at St. Hugh’s College, in the Oxford Journal of Law and Religion Academy.
For further details, click here.
I’m delighted to be participating over the next couple of days in this year’s John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and Culture at Villanova Law School: Catholic Legal Theory: Aspirations, Challenges, and Hopes. My subject is “Tradition and Catholic Legal Theory.”